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The False Allure of Settlement Pressure
Nicholas Almendares*
The threat of “blackmail” or “in terrorem” settlements have shaped the
law, leading courts to conclude that if the plaintiff does not appear likely to
win the case, then the litigation should be halted at an early stage. This
Article questions the established logic of settlement pressure. After clarifying
the concept and presenting the strongest case for it, I show that it cannot
serve as the basis for wide-ranging civil procedure doctrines. Doing so has
perverse results, such as privileging the defendant’s idiosyncratic tastes and
helping corporate managers hide important facts from their shareholders.
In addition, settlement pressure is not the serious problem that it has been
characterized as: rather than being blackmail, it is more analogous to
litigation insurance or hiring expensive attorneys. The doctrines based on
settlement pressure, therefore, lack a sound justification, and settlement
pressure is not a dire threat that the law must step in to counteract. Even in
the context of class actions, the most favorable circumstances for settlement
pressure arguments, a case where the plaintiffs seem unlikely to prevail
should be allowed to proceed, provided it sets out a coherent, bona fide class
claim. A number of prominent decisions, such as Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, ultimately depend on settlement pressure, and therefore ought to be
reconsidered.
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INTRODUCTION
Settlement pressure, or the potential for plaintiffs to extort
“blackmail”1 or “in terrorem”2 settlements from defendants, is an
influential, yet ill-understood concept. The central idea is that the threat
of a large verdict “pressures” the defendant into settling, regardless of
whether they would win at trial. So, defendants end up paying out
substantial settlements when they would, in all likelihood, prevail.
Settlement, so the argument goes, short-circuits the usual litigation
process, creating a potential windfall for plaintiffs even though their cases
lack merit. Courts have responded to these concerns by instituting
preliminary merits inquiries: they estimate the strength of the plaintiff’s
case, and if it is too weak—that is, it appears too unlikely to prevail at
trial—then the litigation is halted.
The most pervasive example of such a rule is the plausibility pleading
regime established by Twombly3 and extended in Iqbal,4 which applies to
all civil cases and relied on settlement pressure as a key rationale. 5 The
clearest example of doctrines informed by settlement pressure, though,
and the focus of this Article, are found in class action jurisprudence. In
order for a case to proceed as a class action, it must be authorized, or
“certified,” by a court, indicating that the class has satisfied all the
requirements set out in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6
1. This phrase is attributed to Henry Friendly. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A
GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973); see also Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification
and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1357 (2003) (quoting Henry Friendly).
2. E.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 474 (2013); Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007).
3. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
4. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
5. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–59.
6. The Federal Rules also, in effect, govern many state class actions, as the states have adopted
rules that are nearly identical and look to federal precedent. See, e.g., Wyeth, Inc. v. Blue Cross &
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As part of this analysis, courts routinely take the merits of the case into
account, sparking an ongoing debate as to how much the ultimate
disposition of a case should matter at the class certification stage. 7 An
especially clear example of how settlement pressure has shaped class
action doctrine is In re Rhone-Poulenc,8 which changed the class action
landscape.9 Seemingly ignoring the then-current Supreme Court
precedent,10 Judge Posner’s opinion held that “the plaintiffs’ claims,
despite their human appeal, lack legal merit”11 and accordingly reversed
the lower court’s decision to certify the class.12 As articulated in
Rhone-Poulenc, the class certification decision now hinges on the
persuasiveness of the claim on behalf of the class. More recently, the
Supreme Court added a similar consideration of the merits to the basic
Rule 23 class certification analysis. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes13 not
only endorsed heightened requirements for class certification, but
concluded that a plaintiff’s theory of the case must be judged reasonably
persuasive for them to carry their Rule 23 burdens and be entitled to class
certification.14 Wal-Mart thus implicitly extended decisions like
Rhone-Poulenc and Castano v. American Tobacco Co. by applying a
preliminary merits inquiry universally; all class actions must now meet
this threshold.
Settlement pressure is essential to these preliminary merits inquiry
doctrines and not only because courts15 and scholars16 explicitly rely on
Blue Shield of Ala., 42 So. 3d 1216, 1221 (Ala. 2010); Medina v. Conseco Annuity Assurance Co.,
121 P.3d 345, 348 (Colo. App. 2005); Mattson v. Mont. Power Co., 291 P.3d 1209, 1213 (Mont.
2012).
7. See infra notes 39–50 and accompanying text (explaining that prior to the Court’s decision
in Wal-Mart, courts inconsistently considered a claim’s merits when ruling on class certification).
8. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
9. Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New Perspective on Class
Action Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 683 (2005).
10. See notes 41–44, infra, and accompanying text; Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its
Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1872, 1880 (2006).
11. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299.
12. Id. at 1304.
13. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
14. See Part I.B., infra.
15. For example, AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011); Messner v.
Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784–85 (3d Cir. 1995); Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort
Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV. 157, 187 (1998).
16. E.g., Sheila Birnbaum, Class Certification—the Exception, Not the Rule, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 347, 350–51 (1997); FRIENDLY, supra note 1, at 120; Milton Handler, The Shift from
Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—the Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust
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it as a rationale. All else being equal, if the plaintiff’s case is weak,
meaning not that it is frivolous, but simply that it is unlikely to win at the
end of the day, then this is a problem that largely solves itself: the
plaintiffs will simply lose on the merits. The overriding consideration in
that instance would be controlling litigation costs, something which
preliminary merits inquiries are poorly equipped to do because estimating
the strength of the case is itself very costly. 17 The main justification for
preliminary merits inquiries is settlement pressure.
As illustrated by landmark class action decisions like Rhone-Poulenc
and Wal-Mart, settlement pressure has undoubtedly shaped the law. The
idea also has intuitive appeal: if defendants really are being extorted, then
the law should take steps to mitigate that effect. Naturally, courts should
not be in the business of enabling blackmail. Yet, for all the rhetorical
force settlement pressure can bring to bear, it creates an immediate
puzzle. Settlement, in and of itself, is not considered problematic. Indeed,
it is habitually encouraged and is often an efficient decision. Moreover,
settlement is sensitive to the strength of the case; all else being equal a
stronger case will settle for a higher value than a weaker one.18 In order
for settlement pressure to make any sense, it must put the defendant at
some sort of material disadvantage. This is necessary to distinguish
settlement pressure from an extremely broad critique of either the
institution of settlement itself, or, indeed, of the entire system of private
law, either of which would call for an entirely different legal response
than the present doctrines. Settlement pressure uses inherently normative
language—pressure, extortion, blackmail, and so on—so some harm it
inflicts must be identified. Otherwise, there is a large body of law
committed to stymieing perfectly reasonable, sometimes even laudable,
conduct at the expense of large groups of plaintiffs.
The best solution to this puzzle, which also explains why settlement
pressure has figured so prominently into class action doctrine, is that its
root cause is the defendant’s risk aversion or something that induces
analogous behavior. A risk averse defendant places more weight on the
potential for heavy losses; for such a defendant, a small chance of very
large damages is not balanced out by the correspondingly larger chance
of winning the trial and not having to pay anything. A sufficiently risk
averse decision maker would, for example, prefer a $120 settlement to a
Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971); Kanner & Nagy, supra note 9, at 698–99; Barry F. McNeil
& Beth L. Fancsal, Mass Torts and Class Actions: Facing Increased Scrutiny, 167 F.R.D. 483, 490
(1996); Silver, supra note 1, at 1360 n.17.
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. See infra Part II.A.
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ten percent chance of having to pay $1000 in damages, even though the
latter option entails an expected cost of only $100. Risk aversion also
explains why a defendant might regard a class action differently than a
series of individual cases brought on behalf of class members. The class
action aggregates those cases into a single trial, and while the actual value
of the claims do not change—the class claims and the individual ones are
worth the same overall—a risk averse defendant puts more weight on the
single trial and is willing to pay more to resolve it. 19 In this way a class
action potentially pressures a risk averse defendant into settling, and at a
premium. It is not just that defendants “may not wish to roll [the] dice”20
on taking the case to trial, but that they will be willing to pay extra for the
privilege of not doing so. The best way to understand these doctrines,
then, is that this risk premium21 is what they endeavor to address through
preliminary merits inquiries. Alternatively, there are other features of the
defendant, such as how it is organized or its business model, that can lead
it to behave as if it is risk averse, inducing the same behavior.
With a clearer, more complete picture of the underlying causes of
settlement pressure, we can evaluate these preliminary merits inquiry
doctrines. Despite their possible intuitive appeal, they rest upon
misapprehensions of the legal and normative implications of settlement
pressure. Upon examination, managing the defendant’s risk aversion or
related incentives, which is ultimately what these doctrines do, is neither
necessary nor socially beneficial. Doing so has the perverse result of
enlisting courts to, inter alia: cater to the defendant’s idiosyncratic
attitudes and preferences, enable corporate directors to better hide their
activities from their own shareholders, thereby rewarding bad behavior,
and conceal potentially vital information from the public. Naturally, none
of these serve as good grounds to base sweeping procedural doctrine on.
Furthermore, the normative idea at the heart of the settlement pressure
argument is flawed. Settlement pressure does not, in fact, inflict the sort
of harm that has been ascribed to it. In cases where it affects the
defendant’s decision-making, so that it is willing to pay the risk premium
at settlement, it is not being extorted. The settlement the defendant
chooses to pay is in its interests given what it deems valuable and

19. Risk aversion is explained in more detail in Part II., infra.
20. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
21. See W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
101, 104 (1988) (developing an empirical formula to estimate a plaintiff’s risk by weighing the
perceived probability of winning a case and receiving an award compared to the probability of
losing a case).
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important.22 From the defendant’s perspective, the settlement is a
reasonable “purchase.” In short, it receives value for its money. Indeed,
in these cases, the settlement functions as a form of litigation insurance
and is similar to the decision to retain expensive legal counsel, decisions
the law does not generally treat as suspect.
In addition, the preliminary merits inquiries themselves carry their own
set of practical problems. The standard for these inquiries is inherently
vague and subjective, making it difficult for courts to apply and
impossible for them to do so consistently. The same case might be
certified or not depending on the particular judge and their idiosyncrasies.
Preliminary merits inquiries also risk stifling legal innovation as claims
based on novel legal theories become particularly unlikely to go to trial,
preventing them from advancing the law.
This set of doctrines, therefore, rests on a shaky foundation. It is hard
to overestimate how influential the concept of settlement pressure has
been, but we should reexamine its implications. I focus on class action
doctrine in this Article for two reasons: one practical and one
methodological. At a practical level, settlement pressure has had the
strongest, most direct impact on this area of law. Methodologically,
settlement pressure is most apparent in class actions; certifying a class
exacerbates a defendant’s risk aversion, which might warrant a legal
response, especially since the class action procedure is responsible for
increasing the defendant’s risk aversion or similar tendencies. Moreover,
if procedural rules based on settlement pressure bar a class action, but
still leave open the possibility of individual litigation, at least in theory,
the plaintiff could still have a way of adjudicating her rights, 23 mitigating
the social costs of the doctrine. But, I show here that even if we construct
the strongest case for settlement pressure, it cannot serve as a justification
for broad ranging doctrine.
This Article contributes to the literature more generally by providing
22. An alternative approach would be to characterize the defendant’s risk aversion as irrational,
treating the settlement pressure that follows from it as a kind of mistake. Under that account, these
doctrines would become a way of protecting the defendant from itself. For reasons described in
Part II.A., that is not the approach taken in this Article. In addition, that approach seems to radically
change the position of the courts in the course of class action litigation and raises the immediate
question of why they only seek to safeguard the defendant’s interests, even against itself, but do
not adopt such a protective stance over the class members, who are almost always less sophisticated
decision-makers.
23. This consideration was explicit in Rhone-Poulenc: “In most class actions—and those [are]
the ones in which the rationale for the procedure is most compelling—individual suits are infeasible
because the claim of each class member is tiny relative to the expense of litigation. That plainly is
not the situation here.” Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299.
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an in-depth understanding of both settlement pressure and risk aversion,
including their causes and effects. It also entails a unique analysis of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart. Since it came down, Wal-Mart
has been subjected to substantial criticism, the focus of which has been
on the fact that it made class actions more difficult to pursue.24 While this
is undoubtedly true,25 the conventional argument against Wal-Mart rests
on an unproven premise: that more class actions are, all else being equal,
a good thing. The stricter certification rule established by Wal-Mart, or,
indeed, by all of the class action cases instituting preliminary merits
inquiries in some form or another, could potentially be a needed
corrective tool if class certification had been too freely granted.26None of
this Article’s observations about settlement pressure depend on a
debatable claim about how stringent, overall, class certification should
be. Finally, it bears noting that class action doctrine is poised to change
considerably in the coming years. Justice Scalia was an especially
influential voice in the Supreme Court’s class action jurisprudence,
authoring majority opinions in many of these cases, including WalMart.27 These decisions were almost uniformly decided by
narrowly-divided courts, so the addition of Justice Gorsuch, as well as
the impact of Justice Kennedy’s recent replacement by Justice
Kavanaugh, indicates that there is a good chance these doctrines will be
24. E.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 778–80
(2013); Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart,
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 37 (2011); Marcia L. McCormick, Implausible Injuries: WalMart v. Dukes and the Future of Class Actions and Employment Discrimination Cases, 62 DEPAUL
L. REV. 711 (2013); George Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the
Deterrent Class Action, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 24, 29 (2012); Joseph A. Seiner, Weathering WalMart, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1350–51 (2014); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic
Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 479
(2011).
25. See Suzette M. Malveaux, The Power and Promise of Procedure: Examining the Class
Action Landscape After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 659, 662 (2013) (describing
commonality prior to Wal-Mart as “one of the easiest class action thresholds to satisfy”); Richard
Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits of Class
Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 359 (2011) (noting that “plaintiffs who have broader
discovery opportunities may develop support for certification that they would not have been able
to provide under prior regimes”).
26. If this were the case then it would not be unreasonable to argue that the Court has
overcorrected. The clear trend in the Supreme Court’s recent class action jurisprudence has been
more restrictive procedural rules. See supra note 24 (collecting scholarship and providing recent
scholarship and case examples).
27. Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013),
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013), and AT&T Mobility
L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); he dissented in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement
Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013).
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revisited.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I describes the current state
of preliminary merits inquiry doctrines in class actions and explains how
the Wal-Mart decision fits into in this context. Part II contains the main
analysis of settlement pressure and its implications. Part III turns to the
practical issues with preliminary merits inquiries and briefly describes
how courts should approach class certification.
I. CLASS CERTIFICATION AND THE MERITS
A. Preliminary Merits Inquiries
The initial step in a modern class action is class certification. 28 A
preliminary merits inquiry sets some threshold for the class plaintiffs’
probability of success, and if the court determines that the plaintiffs’
claim falls below that threshold—if it is, in the court’s estimation, too
unlikely to succeed on the merits—then the class cannot be certified. The
distinctive element of a preliminary merits inquiry is its timing; it
examines the case’s merits at a very early stage in the litigation, as
summarized in the figure below. Indeed, class certification is really where
the class action begins; it is the stage that marks a class action as that type
of aggregate litigation.

Rhone-Poulenc, the landmark case that set out the preliminary merits
inquiry structure,29 was an unusual class action because thirteen
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
29. For ease of exposition, I am setting aside the unusual procedural posture of Rhone-Poulenc.
It does not affect preliminary merits inquiries or settlement pressure and has been rendered
irrelevant by subsequent amendments to Rule 23.
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individual suits based on the same events and causes of action had already
been decided, with the defendants winning twelve of them.30 Judge
Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit panel, chose to treat this as a
representative sample, implying that the plaintiffs only had about an eight
percent chance of succeeding in their class action,31 leading the Court of
Appeals to remark: “A notable feature of this case, and one that has not
been remarked upon or encountered, so far as we are aware, in previous
cases, is the demonstrated great likelihood that the plaintiffs’ claims,
despite their human appeal, lack legal merit.”32 This probability of
success was deemed too low, and the class action could not proceed. The
ideas articulated in Rhone-Poulenc have not been confined to instances
where there is a clear pattern of individual “test cases” to draw on. In fact,
Rhone-Poulenc changed the class action landscape,33 and its reasoning
has been adopted broadly.34 The decision spells out the basic logic of
settlement pressure: if the defendants settle, then the weakness of the
class plaintiffs’ case will not be addressed in the usual course of litigation;
consequently, it should be taken into account at the earlier class
certification stage.35
The reason that an appeal [from a final judgment] will come too late to
provide effective relief for these defendants is the sheer magnitude of
the risk to which the class action, in contrast to the individual actions
pending or likely, exposes them. . . .
....
. . . They will be under intense pressure to settle. . . If they settle, the
class certification—the ruling that will have forced them to settle—will
never be reviewed.36

The Seventh Circuit also noted that the plaintiffs had a viable option
30. In re Rhone Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296 (7th Cir. 1995).
31. Id. at 1299.
32. The first is a concern with forcing these defendants to stake their companies on the
outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if
they have no legal liability, when it is entirely feasible to allow a final, authoritative
determination of their liability for the colossal misfortune that has befallen the hemophiliac
population to emerge from a decentralized process of multiple trials.
Id. I return to this topic in Part II.E.
33. Kanner & Nagy, supra note 9, at 683.
34. E.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir.
2001), as amended (Oct. 16, 2001); Barreras Ruiz v. Am. Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194, 198
(D.P.R. 1998); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996).
35. Note that this is not quite right. Current law allows for immediate appeal of a class
certification decision. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an
order granting or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to
appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered.”).
36. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1297–98.
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in pursuing their claims individually, framing that possibility in a positive
light due to worries about settlement pressure.37 A more recent opinion
by the Third Circuit framed the issue more generally, noting that “the
potential for unwarranted settlement pressure is a factor we weigh in our
certification calculus.”38
Rhone-Poulenc thus stands for the proposition that, because of
settlement pressure, class actions that look unlikely to ultimately succeed
should not be allowed to proceed.39 This rule touches on the fraught
question of how the merits figure into class certification. Until the
Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart, lower courts faced two competing
precedents.40 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline41 had been interpreted to
hold that that courts could not examine the merits in deciding class
certification; courts should instead provisionally accept the substantive
allegations made by the plaintiffs as true for the purposes of determining
whether the Rule 23 burdens had been met.42 A court following Eisen
would, with that provisional assumption in place, then check whether the
class was sufficiently numerous and the claims sufficiently uniform to
warrant class treatment,43 an approach that resembles the way pleadings
were traditionally considered.44 General Telephone Co. v. Falcon,45 on
the other hand, held that a class action “may only be certified if the trial
court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule
23(a) have been satisfied.”46 Lower courts thus found themselves in the
position of having to balance these two contradictory instructions: Eisen
seemed to mandate accepting plaintiffs’ allegations at face value, while

37. Id. at 1300.
38. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008), as amended
(Jan. 16, 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 168 n.8 (2001)).
39. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299.
40. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
41. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
42. E.g., In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. 403, 419 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (“In evaluating
a motion for class certification, . . . the court does not have the authority to conduct a preliminary
inquiry into the merits of the case, and hence the substantive allegations contained in the complaint
are accepted as true.” (citing Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177–78)); Kallus v. Gen. Host Corp., No. B-87-160,
1988 WL 124074, at *3 (D. Conn. June 30, 1988) (holding that at the class certification stage, “the
Court need not inquire into the merits of the case, but need only examine the plaintiffs’ allegations”
(citing Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177)).
43. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(3) (enumerating categories of claims that qualify for class
certification).
44. See infra, Part III.B.
45. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
46. Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
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Falcon required a court to conduct a thorough investigation.47 By the
2000s, the Courts of Appeals had generally sided with Falcon; Rule 23’s
requirements had to be proven, regardless of whether doing so happened
to overlap with the plaintiffs’ case on the merits.48 Wal-Mart also
endorsed this position, relegating the Eisen position described above to
“purest dictum,”49 a stance the Supreme Court later reiterated.50
What this Article calls a preliminary merits inquiry—such as the
success threshold in Rhone-Poulenc—differs from the rigorous analysis
in Falcon. To satisfy their burdens under Falcon, the class plaintiffs must
prove that all of Rule 23’s requirements have been met.51 This finding is
not a preliminary estimate. It is a conclusion by the court. The court
determines, for example, that the class is sufficiently numerous and that
the named plaintiffs will adequately represent the class as a whole. If
these requirements happen to overlap with the elements of the case,
though, the burdens are not relaxed.52 This overlap frequently occurs in
Rule 23(b)(3) cases, which are those where class action plaintiffs
primarily seek damages53 and have additional procedural requirements.
In such cases, plaintiffs must show that the common questions of law and
fact “predominate” over issues that would only affect individual
claimants,54 so plaintiffs must demonstrate that they can prove each
element of their case without relying on extensive individual
investigations. Crucially, though, they do not need to actually prove those
elements themselves at this stage; the predominance inquiry instead
centers on the nature of the proof the plaintiffs propose to marshal during
the trial, not the quality or persuasiveness of that proof. As one of the
most detailed judicial treatments of class certification explained:
47. E.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d Cir. 2008), as amended
(Jan. 16, 2009); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 2006), decision
clarified on denial of reh’g, 483 F.3d 70 (2007); Lewis Tree Serv., Inc. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 211
F.R.D. 228, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1785 (3d ed. 2018).
48. Initial Pub. Offerings, 471 F.3d 24; see especially id. at 38–39 (collecting cases). See also
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 307; Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d
356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001).
49. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 n.6 (2011).
50. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 502 (2013); Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2013).
51. E.g., Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 311–12.
52. E.g., id. at 307 (“[T]he court must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to class
certification, even if they overlap with the merits—including disputes touching on elements of the
cause of action.”).
53. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 362–63.
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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Importantly, individual injury (also known as antitrust impact) is an
element of the cause of action; to prevail on the merits, every class
member must prove at least some antitrust impact resulting from the
alleged violation. . . .
....
Plaintiffs’ burden at the class certification stage is not to prove the
element of antitrust impact, although in order to prevail on the merits
each class member must do so. Instead, the task for plaintiffs at class
certification is to demonstrate that the element of antitrust impact is
capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class
rather than individual to its members.55

A preliminary merits inquiry is just the opposite: it checks whether the
plaintiffs will be able to prove the elements of their claim. The issue in
Rhone-Poulenc was not how the plaintiffs would prove their case, but
whether they could do so.56 A preliminary merits inquiry, unlike the
considerations that separate Eisen and Falcon, estimates the strength of
the plaintiffs’ case, not the means by which they will be conducting it.
B. Wal-Mart’s Pervasive Merits Inquiry
Although less explicit than Rhone-Poulenc,57 the Supreme Court
adopted a pervasive form of preliminary merits inquiry in Wal-Mart. This
decision has especially sweeping ramifications not only by virtue of being
rendered by the Supreme Court, but also because it affects all class
actions. The central issue58 in Wal-Mart was Rule 23(a)’s commonality
requirement that there must be “questions of law or fact common to the
class.”59 The class’s main allegation was that Wal-Mart’s pay and
55. Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 311–12 (citations omitted).
56. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
57. Rhone-Poulenc itself is far from clear, however. Nagareda, supra note 10, at 1879.
58. The Court also unanimously ruled the claims for backpay could not be certified under Rule
23(b)(2), which was a major change from the common practice. See, e.g., United States v. City of
New York, 276 F.R.D. 22, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (exclaiming that Wal-Mart had “reduced to rubble
more than forty years of precedent . . . which had long held that backpay is recoverable in
employment discrimination class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2)”). While important,
especially for employment law, this change to class action doctrine is not the focus of this Article.
59. “The crux of this case is commonality.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349
(2011). Commonality and typicality—that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class”—“tend to merge.” Id. at 345, 349 n.5. Those
requirements tend to merge with adequacy of representation, at least in part, as well. Gen. Tel. Co.
of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157–58, 157 n.13 (1982). There is a clear logic to this: if the
class claims are all common, then any member of the class will, perforce, have claims typical of
the class. Moreover, that representative can be then trusted to look after the interests of the class as
a whole as they will be identical to her own interests. The Supreme Court in Wal-Mart took care to
focus on commonality, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 349 n.5., and it is on that requirement
that the doctrinal changes were made.
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promotion decisions discriminated against female employees. 60 A quirk
of Wal-Mart’s corporate practices—which ultimately led to the class
being denied certification—was that it granted broad discretion to local
managers; these choices were essentially delegated to them.61 The
plaintiffs alleged that these subjective, unstructured decisions were made
against a set of background conditions that systematically led to
discrimination, and that those background conditions were the product of
Wal-Mart’s actions.62 The most pointed version of the plaintiffs’ theory
of the case was that Wal-Mart cultivated a distinctive corporate culture
and that one of the tenets of this corporate culture was gender bias, such
as an inclination against placing women in high positions within the
company.63 Alternatively, the plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart turned
over personnel decisions to an overwhelmingly male managerial staff and
implicit prejudices took over in a predictable way because the company
authorized managers to use arbitrary and subjective criteria64 and that the
few objective standards that existed disproportionately disadvantaged
women.65 Either theory alleges a causal connection between actions
taken by Wal-Mart’s leadership—propagation of a particular corporate
culture or using unstructured criteria for employment decisions—and a
discriminatory effect.
To support their case, plaintiffs presented evidence of the various
efforts Wal-Mart made to foster a corporate culture, including mandatory
orientation for all employees and frequent meetings on “culture topics.”66
Culture also played an important role in Wal-Mart’s management
training.67 Plaintiffs offered additional testimony from a sociological
expert, Bielby, on this point68 and statistical findings that Wal-Mart

60. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 342.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 344–45.
63. “The plaintiffs’ evidence, including class members’ tales of their own experiences, suggests
that gender bias suffused Wal-Mart’s company culture.” Id. at 371 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
64. Id.
65. Id. See also Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 148 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (further
explaining promotions policies and selection subjectivity), aff’d sub nom. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc.,
474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), opinion withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh’g, 509 F.3d
1168 (9th Cir. 2007), on reh’gen banc sub nom. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th
Cir. 2010), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
66. Id. at 151.
67. Id.
68. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d at 601–03 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338
(2011).
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treated women differently than men in terms of wages and promotion.69
On the basis of this evidence the district court concluded that “[t]here is
no genuine dispute that Wal-Mart has carefully constructed and actively
fosters a strong and distinctive, centrally controlled, corporate culture.”70
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that this evidence could not
meet the plaintiffs’ Rule 23 burdens because it did not show to what
extent this corporate culture actually controlled employment decisions at
Wal-Mart.71 That is, plaintiffs had not proven the alleged causal
connection between the company’s corporate culture and discriminatory
behavior.72 As Justice Scalia explained for the Court:
Bielby’s testimony does nothing to advance respondents’ [plaintiffs
below] case. Whether 0.5 percent or 95 percent of the employment
decisions at Wal-Mart might be determined by stereotyped thinking is
the essential question on which respondents’ theory of commonality
depends. If Bielby admittedly has no answer to that question, we can
safely disregard what he has to say.73

The majority opinion in Wal-Mart thus ties proving the causal
connection that is needed for the plaintiffs’ case in chief to their “theory
of commonality.”74 With the corporate culture at Wal-Mart discounted,
the plaintiffs’ main theory of the case falls apart. Even if they could
convincingly establish that Wal-Mart systematically treated female
employees differently, that would not suffice because they could not
identify any particular wrongdoing by the defendant that caused the
disparity.75 Without corporate culture or some implicit policy or practice
like it, all that remains is Wal-Mart’s delegation of employment decisions
to local managers, which does not, the Court held, constitute a common
practice throughout the company.76 So, the plaintiffs could not satisfy the
commonality requirements as Wal-Mart conceives of them.
Unlike Rhone-Poulenc, Wal-Mart did not directly refer to the case’s
merits, or lack thereof. But, if the plaintiffs had established this causal
69. Id. at 604–10.
70. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. at 151.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 354–55 (internal quotation marks and
modifications omitted).
74. Id. at 354.
75. “[M]erely proving that the discretionary system has produced a racial or sexual disparity is
not enough. The plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific employment practice that is
challenged. That is all the more necessary when a class of plaintiffs is sought to be certified.” WalMart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 357 (internal quotation marks and modifications omitted) (quoting
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)).
76. Id. at 358.
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connection between Wal-Mart’s corporate culture and discriminatory
hiring practices, then they would have essentially proven their case. They
would have identified the defendant’s actions (fostering this corporate
culture) and shown that it caused the alleged harm (biased hiring
practices). Taken at face value, the Wal-Mart plaintiffs make out what
looks like a perfectly viable class claim. The corporate culture argument
might be weak since the connection between corporate culture and hiring
decisions across the company may be difficult to prove, as Justice Scalia
remarked, but it raises common questions of law and fact central to the
litigation77 because Wal-Mart, by all accounts, has a single, uniform
corporate culture.78 The shift in class action doctrine put in place by
Wal-Mart has been summarized as: “[I]t was not enough for plaintiffs to
pose the question of whether there was a pattern or practice of
discrimination to satisfy commonality. Now plaintiffs must know the
answer.”79
The Supreme Court seemed to demand that the Wal-Mart plaintiffs
persuasively establish not only that the company had a corporate culture,
but that the corporate culture had the consequences they alleged. Indeed,
the existence of a corporate culture, of some form, at Wal-Mart did not
appear to be in doubt.80 A uniform corporate culture that did not
demonstrably affect employment decisions, and in the right way,
however, would not suffice for class certification. In this way, Wal-Mart
instituted an inquiry into the merits of the claim at the class certification
stage as part of Rule 23’s commonality requirement.81 Had Bielby been
77. The Wal-Mart Court also held that only common questions “central to the validity of each
one of the claims,” id. at 350, or that “drive the resolution” of class claims can establish
commonality. Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)). See also Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 909 (7th
Cir. 2012) (“This unofficial policy is the common answer that potentially drives the resolution of
this litigation.” (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 349–51)), cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 569 U.S. 901 (2013). Earlier cases varied in their approach to this issue. For example, after
noting that commonality is construed permissively, Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp. stated that “[a]ll
questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule. The existence of shared legal
issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled
with disparate legal remedies within the class.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th
Cir. 1998). On the other hand, Sprague v. General Motors Corp. explained that “[w]hat we are
looking for is a common issue the resolution of which will advance the litigation,” a standard
similar to, if still somewhat looser than the one adopted by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart. Sprague
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 1998).
78. See supra notes 63–70.
79. Malveaux, supra note 24, at 38.
80. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (articulating the Court’s finding that there was
“no genuine dispute” that Wal-Mart had a strong corporate culture).
81. George Rutherglen wonders whether the Wal-Mart plaintiffs would have succeeded had
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able to, for example, show that a substantial amount of employment
decisions were determined by the discriminatory corporate culture, then
the case in chief would have been over; all else being equal, the plaintiffs
would have won.
Class actions after Wal-Mart bear out this doctrinal shift, requiring the
plaintiffs’ theory of the case to be plausible—namely, that there be a
reasonably clear connection between the defendant’s actions and the
alleged harm. An illustrative example82 of the post-Wal-Mart standard is
M.D. v. Perry,83 a complex class action on behalf of children in long-term
foster care programs run by the State of Texas. The plaintiffs made a
number of allegations, but their central claim was that the state failed to
employ enough caseworkers to ensure the class members’ safety.84 Upon
first examination, commonality in this case should be straightforward to
establish. Unlike Wal-Mart, the M.D. v. Perry plaintiffs referenced an
official policy or practice by the defendants.85 The state clearly
determined the number of caseworkers and their workload, and there was
no evidence that these decisions were delegated to the discretion of local
supervisors as in Wal-Mart.86 The Fifth Circuit held, however, that
Wal-Mart required more,87 including a “rigorous analysis” of the
“elements and defenses for establishing any of the proposed class claims”
that examined the “requisite proof for each of the proposed class claims
in order to ensure that differences among the class members do not
preclude commonality.”88 This formulation sounds similar to
predominance, though, again, that would only entail looking at the sort
of proof involved in the case. It would also be fairly easy to show that the
foster children could prove their claim on a class-wide basis: the theory
of the case strongly resembled class action prisoner litigation, and all
they submitted stronger evidence, noting that “[r]equiring such evidence, however, approaches ever
more closely a full-fledged examination of the merits.” Rutherglen, supra note 24, at 29. He argues
that this would be barred under Eisen, but Wal-Mart’s complete dismissal of that case casts some
doubts on its continued effects. Id.
82. Another example is McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d
482 (7th Cir. 2012).
83. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 2012).
84. Id.
85. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 39–40 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
86. Id.
87. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg, 675 F.3d at 839. See also Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to
“Resolvability”: A New Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1001 (2005)
(“The consensus view among courts and commentators is that the critical determination in deciding
whether to certify claims for class action treatment is whether the factual and legal questions that
unite class members are relatively more significant than the questions that divide them.”).
88. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg, 675 F.3d at 842–44.
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class members were subject to the state’s policies. On remand, the district
court scrutinized the class claims and the evidence presented in support
of them, concluding that the number of caseworkers available was
connected to the alleged harm and certifying the class.89 The analysis
necessary for class certification extended far beyond the type of proof that
plaintiffs intended to present to prove their case, instead looking into the
extent or quality of that proof.
The post Wal-Mart case law reveals a standard for class actions akin
to the plausibility pleading rules instituted by Twombly and Iqbal.90
Twombly, itself a class action case, modified the notice pleading regime
so that a viable complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”91 Iqbal extended this standard to all
civil cases and elaborated on the ways courts should go about enforcing
it, defining a case as “plausible” when the pleading shows that there is a
reasonable possibility of relief.92 Judges are supposed to rely on their
experience and common sense to make this assessment.93 Crucial to both
Twombly and Iqbal was whether a different, innocent explanation for the
defendant’s actions existed. The existence of “an obvious alternative
explanation” in both cases rendered the respective plaintiffs’ claims
implausible.94 This reasoning closely parallels the Supreme Court’s
treatment of commonality in Wal-Mart.95 The Twombly/Iqbal standard is
not, however, identical to the new commonality standard. Notably, courts
must “probe behind the pleadings”96 to determine whether class plaintiffs
89. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg, 294 F.R.D. at 39–46. See also Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895
(4th Cir. 2015), Jimenez v. Allstate Insurance Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2835 (2015), and In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Products
Liability Litigation, 722 F.3d 838, 854–55 (6th Cir. 2013) for further examples of this approach
taken to commonality after Wal-Mart.
90. Others have noted this similarity. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 24, at 716 (“Although
it did not cite Twombly or Iqbal, the majority seemed to draw very heavily upon the notion of
plausibility in analyzing whether the evidence demonstrated commonality.”); Arthur R. Miller,
Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the
Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 319 n.125 (2013) (suggesting a
similarity between the Wal-Mart holding and the plausibility standard derived from Twombly and
Iqbal).
91. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
92. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). See also id. at 681 (noting that the plaintiff’s
allegations were too conclusory for them to be entitled to a presumption of truth).
93. Id. at 689.
94. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681–83; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567–68.
95. The Wal-Mart Court explained: “[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any
corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would
select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable
disparity at all.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011).
96. Id. at 350.
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have carried their Rule 23 burdens while plausibility pleading examines
just those documents. Yet, the doctrines share a common thread: if the
claims do not appear sufficiently likely to prevail on the merits, then they
cannot go forward on procedural grounds.
Justice Ginsburg dissented in Wal-Mart, faulting the majority for
conflating the related, but far more demanding, predominance
requirement from Rule 23(b)(3)97 and Rule 23(a)’s commonality one.98
As noted above, analyzing predominance often touches on the merits.
Establishing predominance requires essentially presenting a blueprint for
the case; plaintiffs will have to sketch how they will prove each element
of the cause of action and how doing so does not resort to extensive
individual inquiries or evidence. The majority in Wal-Mart demanded
something more. Bielby’s testimony, of course, did not entail any
individual inquiries.99 The defect the Supreme Court identified with his
testimony was what it actually proved—or failed to prove—not the nature
of the evidence.100 That is fundamentally different from predominance
analysis. Predominance is essentially a question of methodology: how do
plaintiffs purport to prove their case, and can it be done on a class-wide
basis? Wal-Mart looked at the substance and persuasiveness of the
evidence. For this reason, the decision makes the merits relevant to class
certification in a way they were not before.101
The preliminary merits inquiry that Wal-Mart instituted is especially
pervasive. As one of Rule 23(a)’s threshold requirements, commonality
is something that all federal, and many state,102 class actions must satisfy.
Cases like Rhone-Poulenc can be distinguished due to their size and the
potential damages entailed: if the single court and jury considering the
class action does not “hold the fate of an industry in the palm of its
97. E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997).
98. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 374–76 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
99. See id. at 353–55 (summarizing Bielby’s testimony).
100. Id. at 354 (“Bielby’s testimony does nothing to advance [the class’s] case.”).
101. Compare the cases cited above to In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305
(3d Cir. 2008), as amended (Jan. 16, 2009), which is one of the most detailed and rigorous
treatments of Rule 23 prior to Wal-Mart. See also Rutherglen, supra note 24, at 29 (comparing and
contrasting Wal-Mart and AT&T Mobility and the effect they have on class action claims);
Malveaux, supra note 24, at 37 (positing that “[b]y redefining class certification requirements . . .
the Court compromises employees’ access to justice”); Miller, supra note 90, at 319 n.125
(speculating that Wal-Mart has created a plausibility threshold akin to Twombly); A. Benjamin
Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 441, 476–78 (2013) (explaining that Wal-Mart created a “threshold skepticism” that courts
must practice as to the case’s merits when faced with a class action certification decision).
102. See supra note 6.
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hand,”103 then Rhone-Poulenc’s logic may not apply.104 Along the same
lines, the Supreme Court remarked that the Wal-Mart litigation presented
them “with one of the most expansive class actions ever.”105 That case
also relied on specific employment discrimination precedents,106 so there
was some indication that Wal-Mart could be similarly cabined.107 Despite
the suggestions of some courts108 and commentators,109 however, the
new commonality requirements have been applied broadly, regardless of
the size of the case or the substantive law involved. 110 In addition, the
Court appeared to moderate its position in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut
Retirement Plans,111which held that Rule 23 only authorized inquiries
into the merits to the extent that they are relevant to determining whether
class certification requirements have been met.112 But, that does not
103. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995). See also, e.g., Castano
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996) (“In what may be the largest class action
ever attempted in federal court, the district court in this case embarked ‘on a road certainly less
traveled, if ever taken at all,’ and entered a class certification order.” (citations omitted)).
104. See, e.g., Barnes v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 310 F.R.D. 551, 562 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
(distinguishing Rhone-Poulenc because the defendant does not face an “existential threat”); In re
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 203, 210 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (distinguishing RhonePoulenc because “in this case a single jury may determine the fate of a single company, but surely
will never hold an entire industry in its hands”), on reconsideration, 172 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio
1997); Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., 2 P.3d 27, 36 (Cal. 2000), as modified (Aug. 9, 2000) (holding
that the “concerns aired in Rhone-Poulenc and Castano are not implicated here” in part because the
case “does not involve potentially ruinous liability”); Garrard Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Jackson, 12
S.W.3d 686, 690 (Ky. 2000) (opining that Rhone-Poulenc was distinguishable because the
defendant was not required to choose between a trial with potentially ruinous liability and settling
“on more equitable terms”).
105. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 342.
106. The Court leaned heavily on General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147 (1982).
107. See Seiner, supra note 24, at 1345–46 (noting an argument could be made to confine the
Wal-Mart decision to only cases against large employers).
108. Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 909 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 569 U.S. 901 (2013); Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 276 F.R.D. 167, 171–72 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
109. See generally Seiner, supra note 24.
110. Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 683 (9th Cir. 2014) (state prisoners alleging unsafe
conditions and deficient care); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig.,
722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2013); M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 2012);
Jones v. Gusman, 296 F.R.D. 416, 465–66 (E.D. La. 2013) (detainees suing law enforcement for
conditions); Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587, 596 (D. Or. 2012) (alleging violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act); Dvorin v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., No. 3:12-CV-3728-G, 2013
WL 6003433, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2013) (royalty payments from oil and gas leases).
111. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013).
112. “Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the
certification stage. Merits questions may be considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that
they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are
satisfied.” Id. at 466.
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speak to the merits analysis that Wal-Mart wove into Rule 23 itself.
Amgen has not yet curbed Wal-Mart’s impact or stopped courts from
engaging in the rigorous claims dissection described above.113 At present,
a direct consideration of the merits of the case is a part of class
certification.
C. Litigation Costs
Before turning to settlement pressure and its implications, it is worth
discussing the other leading rationale for preliminary merits inquiries.
Litigation costs have been a consistent concern and have motivated
various procedural proposals.114 They are also at the root of one early
account of settlement pressure, where the threat of protracted, costly
litigation induces a defendant to settle.115 Discovery, especially class
action discovery, which proceeds “on a gargantuan scale,” was deemed
the primary source of these costs.116 Discovery costs loom especially
large when nearly all the relevant information is in the defendant’s hands,
such as in antitrust or merger suits.117 As a general matter, it is not clear
how restricting class actions serves to alleviate litigation costs. While
class litigation is complex and costly, it is almost assuredly more efficient
than hundreds of rounds of individual litigation118 on very similar sets of
facts.119 If the comparison being made is between a class action and no
litigation, then the class action clearly carries a greater administrative
burden, but avoiding the burden would be at the expense of potentially
abandoning the plaintiffs’ legal rights. It is similarly not obvious how
113. In addition to M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg, 675 F.3d 832, see Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d
895, 904 (4th Cir. 2015), analyzing previous similar cases’ success, and Jacobsen v. Allstate
Insurance Co., 310 P.3d 452, 462 (Mont. 2013), noting a more rigorous approach taken when
analyzing claims. See also In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1187 (N.D.
Cal. 2013) (summarizing recent developments in this area of law).
114. E.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007); Richard A. Epstein, Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 76 (2007); William H. Wagener, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee
Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1887 (2003).
115. Handler, supra note 16, at 8–9.
116. Id. at 7.
117. Wagener, supra note 114, at 1902. See also, e.g., Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp.,
425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976); Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter: A Study of Settlements
in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 549–50 (1991); Patrick M. Garry et al., The
Irrationality of Shareholder Class Action Lawsuits: A Proposal for Reform, 49 S.D. L. REV. 275,
283 (2004).
118. Although, the costs for the individual cases would be spread out among different courts.
119. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010)
(explaining how class action litigation enables courts to adjudicate many claims from multiple
parties at once).
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class actions per se increase or exacerbate discovery costs. An individual
claim based on the same theory would force the defendant to produce
much of the same materials. Consider, for example, if an individual
plaintiff in Wal-Mart sued on the basis of the same corporate culture
theory that the class put forward. She would still need to depose the
leadership, investigate the company’s efforts to maintain a uniform
corporate culture, and so on. The scope of the discovery would probably
be smaller—information about neighboring stores might not be
relevant—but both the individual case and the class litigation would
require much of the same production, especially with regard to
centralized decision-making at the company.
To the extent that discovery costs are a particular problem in class
actions, preliminary merits inquiries do little to address them.120 Since
“Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard”121 plaintiffs will
need evidence to show that they have satisfied its requirements.
Accordingly, courts typically authorize discovery before ruling on class
certification.122 This discovery is limited to things relevant to class
certification, but as merits become more relevant to the class certification
issue, those limits disappear; the discovery necessary for class
certification now resembles full discovery. Consequently, a large portion
of discovery costs, the main litigation costs, must still be borne. The gains
in terms of litigation costs from preliminary merits inquiries are therefore
modest at best. These doctrines do not relieve discovery costs, they

120. Rhone-Poulenc was in the unusual, fortuitous position where the preliminary merits
inquiry had in essence already been performed by the individual cases that preceded the class
action. Once the court chose to treat them as a representative sample, there was little additional
discovery required for the preliminary merits inquiry.
121. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
122. E.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 331 F.3d 13, 21 (2d Cir. 2003); Armstrong
v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 871 n.28 (9th Cir. 2001); Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 331 (5th Cir.
1982) (“[I]n most cases, ‘a certain amount of discovery is essential in order to determine the class
action issue and the proper scope of the class action.’” (quoting Pittman v. E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 552 F.2d 149, 150 (5th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted)); Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., 564
F.2d 1304, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977); Doctor v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 540 F.2d 699, 707 (4th
Cir. 1976); Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 210 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The propriety of a
class action cannot be determined in some cases without discovery . . . .”); In re Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 609, 615 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“[T]he practice employed in
the overwhelming majority of class actions is to resolve class certification only after an appropriate
period of discovery.”) (collecting cases); Bryant v. Food Lion, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1484, 1495
(D.S.C. 1991); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 47, § 1785.3. See also Robert G. Bone & David S.
Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1278 n.103 (2002)
(noting that preliminary merits review, even if not related to a specific Rule 23 requirement, could
prevent class action abuse courts that have inquired into the merits usually do so after some
opportunity for discovery).
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simply push them forward in time.
II. SETTLEMENT PRESSURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
A. Understanding Settlement Pressure
Since litigation costs cannot justify preliminary merits inquiries,
settlement pressure serves as their key justification. Without settlement
pressure, there is no compelling reason for an overarching class action
doctrine that institutes an early assessment of the merits. If the case has
little merit, then the plaintiffs are, by definition, likely to lose, and the
weakness of the case has not caused any substantial harm to the defendant
aside from litigation costs, which these doctrines do little to mitigate.
Claims that are truly baseless or frivolous should be distinguished from
ones that are merely unlikely to succeed (e.g., the evidence is difficult to
gather or the legal theory is novel), and can be better addressed directly
by tools like Rule 11 sanctions.123 Courts have consistently relied upon
this consideration in making class certification decisions.124 The
Supreme Court is no exception,125 although Wal-Mart did not explicitly
rely on settlement pressure. Justice Scalia, the author of the Wal-Mart
majority opinion, has cited it both before and after that decision.126
123. Rule 11 requires that the claims be “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 11(b)(2). In contrast to there being a low probability of the plaintiffs prevailing at trial, a
frivolous claim is considered one “where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance
of success under the existing precedents, and where no reasonable argument can be advanced to
extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands, Rule 11 has been violated.” Eastway Constr. Corp.
v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (emphasis added); accord Golden Eagle
Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986). See generally 5A WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 47, § 1336.
124. E.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
In addition to skewing trial outcomes, class certification creates insurmountable pressure
on defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would not. The risk of facing an all-ornothing verdict presents too high a risk, even when the probability of an adverse
judgment is low. These settlements have been referred to as judicial blackmail.
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
125. E.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo,
544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978). See also
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413 (2014) (describing settlement
pressure concerns as more appropriately addressed to Congress and listing some of the legislative
responses); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 473–76 (2013) (considering
the merits of a securities fraud class action in a class certification appeal).
126. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011) (majority opinion by
Scalia, J.); Amgen, 568 U.S. at 485 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010) (reasoning that allowing multiple claims
to be litigated together is valid because it only alters how the claims are processed). See also
Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at 2424 n.7 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (joined by
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For all the importance that has been put on the concept of settlement
pressure, the reasoning behind it remains somewhat unclear. The core of
the argument is that certifying the class puts significant pressure on a
defendant to settle regardless of the merits of the claim. Since the case
settles, so the argument goes, the weakness of the plaintiffs’ case will not
matter—they will benefit regardless of the merits, or lack thereof, of their
case.
This Part unpacks the idea of settlement pressure in order to determine
what its legal and normative implications actually are. There are several,
sometimes mutually exclusive, accounts of the phenomenon.127 The one
discussed here is the soundest way to think about it. This Article’s
treatment of settlement pressure is not unique, although the implications
drawn from it are.128 To analyze settlement pressure, it is useful to
consider the expected value of a claim, which is calculated by multiplying
the value of the claim by the probability that the plaintiff wins. For
example, the expected value of a $100 wager if a fair coin turns up heads
is $50 ($100 multiplied by ½). If there are 1,000 class members, each of
whom have an identical claim for $100,000 in damages, then the value of
their claim is $100 million (1,000 multiplied by $100,000), and the
expected value of the claim is $100 million multiplied by the probability
that the plaintiffs win their suit. For ease of exposition, I treat this
probability as public information—both sides have the same, correct
estimation of their chances. This is somewhat unrealistic, but introducing
complications like private information does not change things in any way
that is critical to this discussion. In actuality, the defendant is likely to
have superior information about the likely disposition of the trial as it has
a better understanding of its own conduct (at least until discovery is
completed).129 A preliminary merits inquiry by a court would, ideally,
Scalia, J.) (stating that “[t]he absence of postcertification rebuttal is likely attributable in part to the
substantial in terrorem settlement pressures brought to bear by certification.”).
127. See Silver, supra note 1, at 1361 (explaining that there are four versions of the “blackmail
thesis” that each systematically differ).
128. For a different, though not mutually exclusive, treatment of some of these issues, see
Nagareda, supra note 10, at 1882, 1888.
129. Studies that give the plaintiff private information relevant to the litigation tend to focus on
the value of the plaintiffs’ claim. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a
Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988). See also Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous
Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 5 (1990) (noting that “a
defendant can draw inferences about the plaintiff’s private information from the fact that the
plaintiff is willing to bear the cost of filing suit”); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in
Which Suits are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 4–5 (1985)
(discussing the economic advantage to settling even frivolous claims for defendants to prevent trial
costs, even when the defendant knows they will likely prevail should they defend). Warren F.
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reveal this probability to everyone involved.130
Settlement, though, does not in and of itself justify a preliminary merits
inquiry, or any doctrinal innovation for that matter. Settlement is not
inherently problematic. Indeed, courts habitually encourage it: “Over the
past five decades, first state and then federal judges have embraced active
promotion of settlement as a major component of the judicial role.”131
Furthermore, settlement is sensitive to the strength of the plaintiffs’ case,
just like a trial. While the case is not tested before a court of law, the
parties’ settlement negotiations directly depend on their chances at trial.
Those negotiations are a form of bargaining in the shadow of the law; if
they break down and the parties cannot come to an agreement, then there
will be a trial, and then its expected results, in turn, affect the
negotiations.132 If certifying the class leads the defendant to simply settle
for something like the expected value of the claim,133 the defendant has
not suffered any material harm. For settlement pressure to make sense, it
needs something more.
The main difference between a class action and a series of individual
suits by class members is that the class action decides all the cases at
once. It turns the dispute into a single, all or nothing affair. 134 So, while
the class action vehicle does not automatically change the expected value
of the suit, the “variance in outcomes” can increase considerably. 135 To
illustrate, consider an example inspired by Rhone-Poulenc where
plaintiffs have only an 8 percent chance of succeeding. With a large
Schwartz & C. Frederick Beckner III, Toward a Theory of the “Meritorious Case”: Legal
Uncertainty as a Social Choice Problem, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 801, 820 (1998).
130. Tangentially, this suggests that if defendants believe their case is strong, and they have
something like documents to back it up, they could improve their bargaining position by presenting
this information to the other party (perhaps with the court as an intermediary), sending what would
be verifiable signals.
131. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994). See also Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment?
Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the
Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1474–75 (1994) (analyzing how judges “extol the
virtues of settlement . . . to end disputes”).
132. See generally Robert Cooter et. al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable
Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUDS. 225 (1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
133. The actual value of a settlement would be sensitive to the relative bargaining power of the
plaintiffs and defendants. This would still be a function of the claims’ value. Including
considerations of bargaining power or a more extensive model of settlement negotiations does not
alter the main arguments here.
134. The class action also decides the rights of absent class members.
135. Nagareda, supra note 10, at 1882. Richard Nagareda refers to this as the “amplification
effect” of class actions. Id. at 1881.
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number of individual cases, the defendant will win most of them, lose a
few, and be liable for, overall, the expected value of the claims. Using the
numbers above, that would yield a series of cases with an expected value
of $8 million (1,000 cases valued at $100,000 each multiplied by 8
percent). Deciding all the claims at once, though, means that while there
is a 92 percent chance that the defendant wins outright and has to pay
nothing, there is an 8 percent chance that it has to pay the entire $100
million in damages, something that was virtually impossible if the
plaintiffs each brought their cases individually. 136 That being said, the
expected value of both scenarios is identical because the class action does
not change any of the burdens at trial.137 In fact, if we take litigation costs
into consideration, it is likely that the defendant’s expected costs
associated with the class action are smaller.
Litigation costs aside, a risk neutral defendant would treat these two
scenarios identically. The expected value is the same, so such a defendant
would be perfectly indifferent between aggregating the cases and dealing
with them individually.138 But, a risk averse defendant would place more
weight on the potential for heavy losses. Hence, the pressure to settle
stemming from class actions. The 8 percent chance of $100 million in
damages is not, for a risk averse actor, balanced out by the 92 percent
chance of paying $0 the way it is for a risk neutral one. Any pressure to
settle is created by the defendant’s risk aversion—or, as explained below,
something that functions like risk aversion.
Risk aversion explains how settlement pressure could be a problem
that warrants a solution. It could lead defendants to “overpay.” If the
defendant is more worried about suffering large losses, then it will be
willing to pay correspondingly more to avoid it.139 A risk averse
defendant will thus be disposed to settle the example class action for more
136. The probability of being held fully liable in 1000 cases of individual litigation each with
an 8 percent chance of the plaintiff prevailing is essentially zero.
137. There are more complicated cases where we could allow the plaintiffs’ probability of
winning to vary. For example, the existence of the class claims alone might be seen as evidence
that there is a genuine claim. If numerous members of a small community all have a very rare
disease, that could be evidence that there is some unnatural cause to it, lending credence to their
lawsuit against a local polluter. In that instance, though, the plaintiffs’ case is not weak at all, in
fact, it looks fairly strong. Furthermore, the class action itself is not important at all to this evidence:
a series of individual cases would have the same effect, following the logic of the Condorcet Jury
Theorem.
138. This follows straightforwardly from the definition of being risk neutral.
139. This feature of risk aversion is traditionally captured through a concave utility function (a
graphical representation of how the agent values things). Because the utility function is concave,
the magnitude of the loss increases as its size increases. The risk aversion illustration figure captures
the same idea, although with a different presentation than the traditional concave utility function.
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than the $8 million expected value; it might be willing to settle for $10 or
$20 million. The difference between this amount and the expected value
of the claim is the defendant’s risk premium. It also represents the
difference between the same set of claims being aggregated into class
action and being litigated individually. The difference between the way
risk neutral and risk averse defendants consider this risk is depicted in the
figure below, and the difference between the two lines illustrates the risk
premium. The main intuition is that a risk averse defendant treats a large
loss as greater than its “objective” value; it looms larger for that type of
defendant than for a risk neutral one.

At times, the traditional settlement pressure argument seems to take
issue with the defendant paying anything at all in a settlement when the
plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail at trial.140 So, an $8 million settlement in
the stylized example above would be treated as problematic, even
extortionate. But, this reasoning cannot support the doctrine that has
developed around settlement pressure. Settlement pressure has been
relied on to justify limits on when a class action can proceed. If the
standard for class certification, sensitive to settlement pressure concerns,
blocks the class action, then the plaintiffs are still free to pursue their
claims individually (and in this example their claims are sizable enough
that it might be worth doing so). In that situation, the defendant still faces
$8 million in expected liability and is still perfectly willing to settle the
claims individually for what will, at the end of the day, total that amount.
140. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–99 (7th Cir. 1995); Bone & Evans,
supra note 122, at 1255.
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Therefore, a rule that denies class certification in this case does not
protect the defendant from liability; it faces the same expected liability
regardless of whether the claim is certified.141 There is, in expectation,
some payout, whether through settling all these individual cases or taking
some or all of them to trial.142 For the settlement pressure argument to
make sense, something like risk aversion and a risk premium must be
present. Otherwise, the doctrines are, at best, superfluous. This
understanding of the doctrine also fits with the emphasis that cases like
Rhone-Poulenc put on the increase in variance caused by deciding the
entire aggregate dispute in a single trial as well as their approval for
individual, decentralized trials.143 It is the strongest account of settlement
pressure in the class action context.
One other way that class actions can affect the value of a dispute is at
once more obvious and less doctrinally important. Class actions can
increase the number of claims involved, shifting the litigation from
involving just those plaintiffs that happened to have filed suit to the class
as a whole. This difference was noted in Rhone-Poulenc: Only about 300
individual suits had been filed while the class was estimated to include
thousands.144 This “addition effect” of class actions is not independently
considered a cause for concern, though.145 If all these suits have merit,
then they should be heard; the plaintiffs have a legal right that they can
potentially have vindicated. The Supreme Court has said as much:
[Defendant’s] aggregate liability, however, does not depend on whether
the suit proceeds as a class action. Each of the 1,000–plus members of
the putative class could (as [defendant] acknowledges) bring a
freestanding suit asserting his individual claim. It is undoubtedly true
that some plaintiffs who would not bring individual suits for the
relatively small sums involved will choose to join a class action. That
has no bearing, however, on [defendant’s] or the plaintiffs’ legal
rights.146

The reasons that these suits would not be litigated without a class
141. The only difference would be with negative value claims, which would not be brought
except without some mechanism like class actions. I consider these types of cases below.
142. Unsurprisingly, when it comes to settlement, defendants wholeheartedly embrace class
action mechanisms as a means of settling all claims at once.
143. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299–300; Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th
Cir. 1996); Marascalco v. Int’l Computerized Orthokeratology Soc’y Inc., 181 F.R.D. 331, 339
n.19 (N.D. Miss. 1998). See also Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, NearTotal Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 374 (2005) (explaining
arguments economists have asserted regarding class action litigation and its inefficiencies).
144. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298.
145. This phrase is from Nagareda. Nagareda, supra note 10, at 1881. See also id. at 1882.
146. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010).
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action—typically litigation costs or ignorance—are not deliberate legal
or normative choices. They are distortions of the underlying legal or
regulatory system—that is, problems to be solved.147 In an ideal litigation
system these distortions would not exist, and class actions are actually a
means to counteract some of them—notably litigation costs.148 The fact
that class actions can potentially increase the number of claims involved,
without more, does not justify doctrines that restrict their scope or
availability.
All that being said, settlement pressure, even on the detailed account
presented here, does not automatically necessitate a doctrine where class
certification is conditioned on the merits of the case. Settlement pressure
affects any risk averse class action defendant, regardless of the plaintiffs’
likelihood of success. The aggregating quality of class actions occurs
whether the plaintiffs have a 5 percent or 95 percent chance of winning.
The argument for instituting a merits threshold in light of settlement
pressure has not been entirely spelled out by courts, though Richard
Nagareda explains it as a kind of Hippocratic Oath to limit the potential
harms that are thought to be inherent in aggregating claims.149 In order to
mitigate the problems of defendants “overpaying” in a class action
settlement, the preliminary merits inquiry constrains class actions when
they seem most controversial—when the plaintiffs’ case looks especially
weak. The doctrines do nothing to stop settlement pressure or the risk
premium as a general matter, but it addresses the cases that might be
considered the most egregious. The settlement pressure argument can
thus be reframed as: Class actions have the potential to extract, via
settlement, more from the defendant than would have been the case if the
litigation proceeded individual by individual, and preliminary merits
inquiries are based on the proposition that this is most worrisome, and
therefore worthy of judicial intervention, when the plaintiffs’ chances of
actually winning are small.
To summarize, the strongest case for some form of preliminary merits
inquiry in class actions is based on settlement pressure. The weak cases
that these doctrines weed out could be dealt with at trial or with
dispositive motions, and the litigation costs savings from these early
inquiries are minimal. So, the problem that these doctrines seek to solve
must be that the cases never reach the stages where the merits are usually
assessed—they settle before then. That alone, however, is not a sufficient
147. Nagareda, supra note 10, at 1883–84.
148. See also supra Part I.C.
149. Nagareda, supra note 10, at 1893–94.
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rationale because settlement itself is both encouraged and takes the
strength of the case into account. The defendants must therefore suffer
some disadvantage once they are facing a certified class rather than an
equivalent series of individual lawsuits. Otherwise, these doctrines serve
no purpose. The risk premium described above supplies the answer.
It bears noting that while the above discussion has been in terms of
monetary damages; all the foregoing applies to cases where the primary
issue is injunctive relief, such as in a Rule 23(b)(2) action.150 In those
cases, the premium would lead to a more plaintiff-friendly injunction
ordered. The focus on class actions involving money is simply because it
is easier and more intuitive to compare monetary values, but the
reasoning applies broadly.
B. The Implications of Risk Aversion
As explained above, the existence of settlement pressure depends on
risk aversion. Or, alternatively, some feature of the defendant that leads
it to act as if it were risk averse (for my purposes these are equivalent). It
explains why a defendant would treat a class action differently than a
series of individual cases worth the same: to a risk averse defendant, the
aggregate litigation is more costly, a consideration that would lead it to
settle for a greater amount than it would otherwise. Thus, risk averse
behavior can explain the distinct harm a defendant suffers through a class
action; it potentially ends up paying the premium described above. Our
assessment of doctrines that depend on settlement pressure, therefore,
depends on the normative appeal of crafting doctrines in response to the
defendant’s risk aversion. In other words, is it a good idea to design class
action doctrine in response to the defendant’s risk aversion (or similar
behavior)?
Risk aversion describes a kind of behavior, or, more precisely, a way
of valuing alternatives.151 Unlike some scholarship on class actions, this
Article takes the existence of risk aversion on the part of defendants as
given. There are, however, some good reasons to be skeptical about how
widespread and important the phenomenon is.152 Charles Silver critiques
settlement pressure on this point, calling for further empirical study of the
150. Although Robert Bone and David Evans argue for a less demanding preliminary merits
inquiry when injunctive relief is involved. Bone & Evans, supra note 122, at 1307.
151. The term risk aversion is used in this Article to describe the valuing system and behavior
described in the previous section. It designates a certain kind of utility function. Other writers have
used the term in a somewhat more limited way, referring only to cognitive distortions based on
someone’s preferences over risk. See Silver, supra note 1, at 1411.
152. See infra notes 154–158 and accompanying text.
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issue before it can provide a suitable basis for class action doctrine.153
Additional empirical research might not, in and of itself, resolve this
question, though. Suppose that studies showed that risk aversion only
affects 10 percent of defendants. So, in the clear majority of cases, risk
aversion, and through it, settlement pressure, has no significant effect.
Yet, that small subset of cases might affect millions of people, entire
industries, or sweeping government policies, all of which might justify
making law sensitive to the possibility of risk aversion. Indeed, it is not
outlandish to conclude that if a single case or defendant is substantially
impacted by risk aversion, then that should be taken into account. In
short, even if risk aversion is uncommon, that conclusion alone would
probably not be enough to answer the critical legal questions.
For these reasons, I adopt a more theoretical approach here. Once risk
aversion and its analogues are examined more closely, it becomes clear
that there is no compelling reason to design class action procedure around
it. Whether risk aversion and settlement pressure are common or not,
these tactics do not warrant the place they currently occupy in the law.
Risk aversion can be understood as a preference, in the sense that term
is used in economics and social science, where it represents an ordering
of states of affairs and drives decision-making. The defendant’s risk
aversion thus describes its taste for risk, or more accurately its preference
for decreasing risk. It is conceptually the same as a consumer’s preference
for vanilla ice cream or brand loyalty. Someone with these preferences
values the preferred flavor or brand more than the alternatives, all else
being equal, and will act accordingly. They will, for example, pay a
premium. Someone with a strong brand preference for Alfa Romeo’s cars
will pay more for such a car, holding constant its quality and other
characteristics.
Although numerous studies have found evidence of risk aversion,154
there are several considerations that make it difficult to generalize these
findings to the class action context. Defendants in class actions are
frequently corporations since it is unusual for a single individual’s actions
to have a broad enough impact to warrant aggregate litigation. In reality,
then, class action defendants have advantages like limited liability, not to
mention access to the bankruptcy system, which might lead them to act
differently than ordinary people would in the same circumstances. Such
153. Silver, supra note 1, at 1408–29.
154. E.g., Kay-Yut Chen & Charles R. Plott, Nonlinear Behavior in Sealed Bid First Price
Auctions, 25 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 34, 34–78 (1998); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 268 (1979); Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 137 (1996).
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mechanisms are not included in experimental treatments analyzing risk
aversion. A subject might behave entirely differently if she was only
risking some small fraction of her personal endowment, a possible
analogue to limited liability. Furthermore, economists have pointed out
that we should expect risk aversion to vary depending on both the amount
of wealth the decision maker possesses155 and the amount at stake.156
Matthew Rabin has argued that the risk attitudes involved when there are
modest stakes profoundly differ from those when the stakes are large.157
The way individuals behave with small sums at stake (such as in the
typical laboratory experiment) may be fundamentally different from the
way large corporations react to a lawsuit valued at millions or billions of
dollars.
Setting aside these concerns and assuming that risk aversion both
affects class action defendants and plays a prominent role in their
decision-making,158 there are problems with designing class certification
rules around it. One potential issue with taking risk aversion into account
is that it can initially appear to involve a sort of mistake—the defendant
is placing weight and value on something in excess of its “objective”
value. So, class action doctrine is being designed in response to the
defendant’s irrational behavior. Adopting that perspective entails a strong
value judgment, though, privileging this objective value over the actor’s
own preferences, which may be unwarranted. Moreover, legal rules are
often sensitive to mistakes or irrationalities. Bright-line rules are useful,
in part, because they create clear, simple guidelines, which are easier to
follow given common limitations on time, energy, and training. Opt in
and opt out default rules for class actions are similarly sensitive to
cognitive failings.
In addition, not all accounts of risk aversion look like irrationality.
While the simplest, and most common, way to think about risk aversion
is as a psychological attitude, sometimes circumstances lead to risk
averse behavior. Suppose that the defendant is a company with modest
capital reserves. This could cause it to view a single large verdict
differently from a series of smaller ones spread out over time, leading it

155. See generally Lars Tyge Nielsen, Monotone Risk Aversion, 25 ECON. THEORY 203 (2005).
156. Matthew Rabin, Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem, 68
ECONOMETRICA 1281, 1281–83 (2000).
157. Id.
158. But see Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in
Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1403 n.51 (2000) (arguing that
critics overstate the impact of class actions on defendants’ decision-making because many
corporate defendants are designed to withstand the ramifications of a class action lawsuit).
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to be risk averse.159 The same could be true if the company has limited
lines of credit, if the large verdict could disrupt its operations, and so
forth. In these scenarios, the defendant would treat the single class action
verdict differently than numerous individual ones, even though the
expected value is the same. But, the defendant is behaving purely
“rationally.”160 It may even be socially optimal for it to be risk averse:
doing so may keep its workers employed and allow it to continue
operating. What these scenarios and the attitude- or taste-based account
of risk aversion share in common is that they are all idiosyncratic; they
all depend on specific elements of the defendant.
There are two main difficulties with making class action doctrine
sensitive to defendants’ risk aversion. The first is an issue of fairness.
Risk aversion has at least as much of an effect on the decision-making of
class action plaintiffs as it does on defendants.161 Trials are risky for class
plaintiffs, as well. If they lose, they receive nothing, and they may be in
dire circumstances.162 Moreover, all the evidence available that supports
the existence of risk aversion applies to plaintiffs more clearly than it does
defendants: plaintiffs are typically natural persons with unexceptional
wealth endowments. If risk aversion warrants a preliminary merits
inquiry, then the natural next question is why the defendant’s attitudes
toward risk matter so much, but the plaintiffs’ attitudes play no role in
determining the class certification standard. To the extent that doctrine
should take into account the defendant’s attitudes in this regard, it should
consider those of the other party, too.
The second problem with basing class action doctrine on the
defendant’s attitudes toward risk is more fundamental: it entails crafting
procedural rules directly in response to the defendant’s preferences.
Defendants have a number of preferences relating to the litigation, the
most obvious being avoiding any liability. What makes their feelings
toward risk—which are simply preferences like any other163—different
from their feelings toward paying plaintiffs? Similarly, what
distinguishes the requirements for class certification from other
procedural rules164 that impact the result of the litigation? If the
159. One way to look at this is that the company has an induced preference toward risk aversion
rather than a primitive preference in that regard.
160. If the managers of the business have interests that diverge from the shareholders or other
critical stakeholders, then that would be agent-based risk aversion, discussed below.
161. E.g., Rachlinski, supra note 154, at 127–28.
162. Silver, supra note 1, at 1416 (noting that plaintiffs with large personal injury claims settle
cheaply).
163. Or, potentially, preferences induced by other circumstances, as described above.
164. The line between substance and procedure is, admittedly, a fuzzy one. See Sampson v.
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requirements for class certification are designed to take into account the
defendant’s likely165 preferences, then there is no clear, principled way
to distinguish them from other litigation rules that equally affect the
results of the litigation, like allocation of burdens of proof. Accepting this
account of settlement pressure, which at bottom stems from defendant
attitudes, has potentially radical results. The same argument justifies a
host of prodefendant doctrines as it would accord with their typical
preferences, and there is no good way to compartmentalize its
implications. For example, defendants would surely prefer a rule that
treated their experts as much more credible than those speaking on behalf
of the plaintiffs. The settlement pressure argument thus proves too much.
C. Alternative Explanations
So far, I have explained how settlement pressure, the key justification
for preliminary merits inquiries, is based on defendants’ preferences,
possibly induced, toward risk. Defendants’ differential treatment of a
single large case as opposed to numerous small ones must be at the root
of settlement pressure; it creates the problem, the “pressure,” to settle that
courts seek to counteract or mitigate through preliminary merits inquiries.
There are also other possibilities that will lead the defendant to act as if it
were risk averse. I describe two of these here; the characteristic they share
in common is that the class action is a higher profile case than had the
plaintiffs filed individual cases, and the fact that the class action is more
likely to be noticed creates an additional cost to the defendant,
functioning like the risk premium in the basic risk aversion scenario
detailed above.
1. Agency-Focused Account
This risk aversion-like behavior is caused by the structure of the
defendant and divergent interests within it, which create a principal-agent
problem.166 The shareholders (the principal) have interests that differ, to
Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 754 (1st Cir. 1940).
165. The qualification is necessary here because courts, commentators, and this Article are all
making generalizations about these preferences. That is, we are not talking about any specific
defendant’s attitudes toward risks, but rather their attitudes as a group. Proving such attitudes in the
course of litigation would be difficult, if not impossible, and would invite defendants to strategically
plead risk aversion. Alternatively, they could arrange their affairs so as to make themselves appear
risk averse, which raises the same issues as the agency-focused account discussed below.
166. For a more detailed definition of principal-agent problems than the one sketched in the
text, see Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51
ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983), and Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models,
8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 203, 222–23 (2005).
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some degree, from those of the managers (the agent) who make the
day-to-day decisions at the company.167 Principal-agent problems are
common in the case of corporate defendants and are also present in
government entities168 as well as any defendant where nominal authority
and authority to act are separated.169 While managers’ incentives overlap
substantially with shareholders—they both share an interest in the
profitability and survival of the company—they are not necessarily
identical. Managers are usually much more sensitive to the risk that the
company goes bankrupt; their jobs depend on the company’s continued
survival, while shareholders are usually diversified by holding small
investments in many corporations.170 The shareholders’ risks are limited
by their investments, so they might be much more comfortable with an
all-or-nothing gamble at a trial than the managers are.171 The fact that
they are only risking a small economic investment might also lead other
considerations to dominate shareholder decision-making. For instance,
shareholders may prefer their companies to avoid acting in reprehensible
ways. Winning at a trial could be a useful way to vindicate the
corporation’s reputation for shareholders who face little personal cost and
can move their investments to another company. In addition, trials
actually offer shareholders a powerful tool for monitoring their agents, so
they might prefer them in a number of cases where the managers would
not.
Related to this last observation, there is an informational aspect to the
agency-focused account. Agents typically have better access to
information than do their principals. In the corporate context, managers
will know vastly more about the company’s daily activities than the rank
and file shareholders do. This includes the company’s actions that give
rise to potential liability: corporations retain counsel, while the typical
shareholder has neither the energy nor the expertise to judge the legal
consequences of the corporation’s actions. Indeed, monitoring the agent
167. Divergent interests are one of the necessary ingredients of a principal-agent problem. For
example, see Miller, supra note 166, at 205–06.
168. See Nicholas Almendares, Blame-Shifting, Judicial Review, and Public Welfare, 27 J.L. &
POL’Y 239, 255–72 (2012) (describing various principal-agent problems involving elected officials
and administrative agencies).
169. See Miller, supra note 166. See also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 8–10 (1991) for an introduction and informal, firmspecific discussion.
170. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 169, at 11.
171. In this way the agency-focused account incorporates the element of the risk aversion one:
the agents are risk averse, and would guide the defendant to act accordingly, namely by settling and
at a premium. The principals, on the other hand, with much less at stake, are not all that risk averse,
and are willing to go to trial.
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is one of the central challenges facing any principal.172 A single
settlement, which is much smaller than the value of the aggregate class
litigation, is likely to escape the shareholders’ notice. Relatively small
settlements might easily just be treated as part of the corporation’s
operating costs. A major lawsuit for millions, if not billions, 173 of dollars
is more likely to be reported on.174 If the shareholders do not spot the
lawsuits, then they cannot hold the managers accountable for them. As a
hypothetical, suppose the managers adopt a risky business strategy, such
as using a contract that probably violates consumer protection laws.175
The managers might be eager to settle a class action, and with it all
potential claims, even paying a premium to do so, if it means that they
will be able to conceal how their decisions lost the company money and
escape sanctions (i.e., potentially being fired).
Like the induced risk aversion detailed above, the agency-focused
account can be thought of as “purely rational.” Also like the risk aversion
described above, it is not an appealing basis for doctrine. The defendant’s
behavior, namely treating the class action differently than individual
litigation, is a product of the interaction between the principal and the
agent within it—it is a product of the way the defendant organizes itself
and its affairs. The causes of this risk aversion-like behavior are therefore
within the defendant’s control, and it is not at all clear why the law should
172. See, e.g., Almendares, supra note 168, at 255–59 and cites therein (providing an example
of Congress’s different techniques for monitoring bureaucracy). See also Scott Ashworth & Ethan
Bueno de Mesquita, Professors at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago,
Address at the Priorat Workshop on Theoretical Political Science: Multitask, Accountability, and
Institutional Design (2013); Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Dimitri Landa, Address at the Priorat
Workshop on Theoretical Political Science: Does Clarifying Responsibility Always Improve
Policy? (2013).
173. Posner estimated the potential liability in Rhone-Poulenc at $25 billion, spread over
multiple drug companies. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
174. E.g., Glenn Collins, Tobacco Sees Way to Block a Big Lawsuit By Consumers, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 20, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/20/business/tobacco-sees-way-to-block-a-biglawsuit-by-consumers.html (citing Rhone-Polenc and having implications for the Castano class
action); David Cay Johnston, Drug Companies Take Step Toward Settling Hemophiliacs’ AIDS
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/30/us/drug-companiestake-step-toward-settling-hemophiliacs-aids-lawsuits.html; Barry Meier, Offer to Hemophiliacs
with H.I.V. is Set, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/19/business/
offer-to-hemophiliacs-with-hiv-is-set.html. For websites dedicated to informing consumers on
class action lawsuits, see generally TOP CLASS ACTIONS, https://topclassactions.com/ (last visited
Dec. 3, 2018) and BIG CLASS ACTION, https://www.bigclassaction.com/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
175. E.g., AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011) (regarding
mandatory arbitration clauses that required plaintiffs to bring claims individually, not as a class);
Schnall v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 129, 131 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (explaining
plaintiffs’ assertion that AT&T misled consumers by billing them for charges not included in the
advertised rates).
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grant the defendant a windfall just because it chose to structure itself this
way, fully aware of the potential risks. Moreover, the defendant is already
reaping the benefits of the arrangement. A lax monitoring regime—which
could create the circumstances where a defendant treats class actions
differently—spares the principal resources. Also, to the extent the agent
takes actions contrary to the principal’s interests, the principal has not put
the effort into monitoring or managing its agent. Doing so entails costs,176
costs that the principal has simply opted not to take on. In these cases,
then, courts are stepping in to halt some class actions even though the
principal chose to adopt this risky arrangement and already reaped its
benefits. Moreover, barring extreme cases that amount to
unconscionability, the law generally permits parties to engage in risky
contracts,177 so it is not obvious why courts should step in and, in effect,
modify these agreements.
The law can play a role in mitigating principal-agent problems.178
Disclosure rules, for example, make it easier for shareholders to supervise
their agents.179 Requiring administrative agencies to issue environmental
impact statements serves a similar function, informing stakeholders of the
effects of a proposed regulation.180 General civil procedure rules are an
ill-suited tool to deal with issues of this sort, however. They apply
broadly, without taking into account the nuances of the defendant’s
corporate form, the way it rewards its agents, or the specific issue area.181
More importantly, even if we accept that using civil procedure to address

176. See George W. Downs & David M. Rocke, Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for
Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362, 373–74 (1994)
(noting that costs often establish a set of punishments for poor outcomes or removing deterrent to
future agents who might be tempted to act contrary to principal’s interests); Miller, supra note 166,
at 205–06 (providing features of a principal-agency model where principal chooses not to monitor
agent); but see REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 3–4 (3d. ed. 2009).
177. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996). It is the presence of
unknown or hidden risks that raises concerns. See generally Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and
Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 (1984).
178. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 176, at 2–3 (exploring corporate law’s role in
minimizing principal-agent problems).
179. See id. at 38–39 (providing examples of how disclosure allows principals to supervise
agents).
180. Almendares, supra note 168, at 257–58.
181. Note this is not the same as the procedural rules being transusbstantive. Taking into
account how the defendant is organized, the nature of its employment contracts with the corporate
leadership, and so on would be a much more detailed, specific endeavor than applying different
procedural rules depending on the cause of action. This Article, however, treats the class
certification rules, especially commonality as currently envisioned by the Supreme Court, as
transusbstantive.
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principal-agent problems is desirable, a preliminary merits inquiry
actually has the opposite effect: raising the standards for class
certification helps enable that principal-agent problem. The managers do
not even have to attempt to quickly and quietly settle the class claim. The
court ends up doing that work for them, making it that much less likely
that the shareholders will be alerted to potential wrongdoing. The results
are just the opposite of disclosure rules and similar legal tools that attempt
to alleviate principal-agent problems.182 Courts, obviously, should not be
in the business of helping conceal misbehavior by corporate managers or
other agents. Preliminary merits inquiries also create perverse incentives
here: courts would be stepping in when the defendant itself should be
attending to its own principal-agent problems. The law would effectively
be subsidizing those defendants that did not bother to manage their own
agents. Those defendants that do make the effort are not granted the same
benefit. Indeed, in a competitive market, the courts’ decision to adopt
preliminary merits inquiries could drive the more responsible firms out
of business because the latter will be bearing the costs of monitoring their
agents. So, the preliminary merits inquiry actually rewards bad behavior
on two levels: it helps agents conceal important information from their
principals, exacerbating principal-agent problems, and it subsidizes
principals that cannot be troubled to discipline their own agents.
2. Publicity-Focused Account
Like the agency-focused account, this behavior is a byproduct of the
defendant’s strategic considerations. It resembles the information
element of the agency-focused account but substitutes the general public
in place of the principal that the agent wants to conceal the class action
litigation from. Naturally, the general public does not usually scrutinize
various companies’ activities; it has considerably less information, and
less incentive to gather information, about any given company than its
shareholders do. The defendant may be willing to pay in order to settle
182. Like risk aversion, principal-agent problems exist on the plaintiffs’ side of the litigation as
well. While the plaintiffs’ attitudes toward risk have not played the prominent role in class action
cases that defendants’ attitudes have, the principal-agent problems that class plaintiffs face have
received substantial attention from courts and commentators. E.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527
U.S. 815, 852–53 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–628 (1997); Pettway
v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1177 (5th Cir. 1978); Alexander, supra note 117, at
535–36; John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the
Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Samuel Issacharoff, Class
Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805 (1997); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class
Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 737 (2013) (citing S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14–20 (2005)).
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the class action that is a higher profile case so as to keep the public
uninformed about its actions. This leads the defendant to act as if it were
risk averse, treating the more visible class litigation differently from
individual cases that have the same total expected value. The defendant
in this scenario displays the same characteristics as a risk averse one,
though the root cause is different. In essence, negative press can create
an additional cost associated with class action litigation.
Working to conceal class action litigation from the public clashes with
the longstanding tradition of public access to judicial proceedings.183
This access serves two primary goals. First, it ensures fairness in the
exercise of justice: “[O]ne of the important means of assuring a fair trial
is that the process be open to neutral observers.” 184 Second, it promotes
trust in the justice system.185 The Supreme Court has recognized a
constitutional right to observe criminal trials and some pretrial
proceedings,186 and while it has not definitively identified an analogous
constitutional right with regards to civil trials,187 other courts have.188
There is also a common law right to access the workings of the
judiciary,189 and similar rights are often expanded by statute.190
Public access to court proceedings is not limitless,191 and there has
been a lively debate about its boundaries.192 Information produced in the
183. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105
HARV. L. REV. 427, 428 (1991) (“By longstanding tradition, the American public is free to view
the daily activities of the courts through an expansive window that reveals both our civil and
criminal justice systems.”).
184. Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. for Riverside Cty., 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986); Nixon v.
Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 n.7 (1978) (collecting cases); see also Cowley v.
Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 393–94 (1884) (noting that public court reports and proceedings are
important for public good).
185. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (and cites
therein); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571–72 (1980) (plurality opinion).
186. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580; see also Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 611
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Richmond Newspapers Court concluded the First
Amendment protects right of press and public to attend criminal trials); Publicker Indus., Inc. v.
Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1068 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining that the First Amendment guarantees a right
to access to criminal trials).
187. Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1067–68.
188. E.g., id. at 1070; In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984);
Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983).
189. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597.
190. See Miller, supra note 183, at 441–45 (providing examples of state legislation expanding
the common law right to access judicial proceedings).
191. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984); Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.
192. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 183, at 428, 436–45 (describing the debate); Andrew D.
Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access to Information
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course of pretrial discovery has frequently been considered outside the
scope of this right.193 There is also some dispute over what constitutes a
judicial record and therefore what information is available to the
public.194 A dispositive motion and the documents that justify it are an
easy case and clearly qualify as a judicial record, but other examples less
central to determining the outcome of a case divide courts.195 These
disagreements have little to do with the publicity-based account here,
though. In this context, what the defendant would want to conceal from
the public is the very existence of the lawsuit, which is central to the
litigation and does not fall within the recognized exceptions to public
access to proceedings, which include discovery, settlement negotiations,
classified government information, trade secrets, and attorney-client
communication.196 Even those that support limits on public access to
judicial proceedings would make the complaint and verdict public.197
While settlements happen outside the public view198—a fact that is
variously lamented,199 accepted as necessary,200 and defended201—the
very fact that there has been a settlement, or a lawsuit in the first place, is
public. Furthermore, as with principal-agent problems, if there is a good
reason to avoid publicizing some aspects of a particular case,202

Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375 (2006); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E.
Ribstein, Class Action Lawyers As Lawmakers, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 733 (2004); Giles T. Cohen,
Comment, Protective Orders, Property Interests and Prior Restraints: Can the Courts Prevent
Media Nonparties from Publishing Court-Protected Discovery Materials?, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2463 (1996); R. Bryan Morrison, Note, To Seal or Not to Seal? That Is Still the Question: Arkansas
Best Corp. v. General Electric Capital Corp., 49 ARK. L. REV. 325 (1996).
193. E.g., Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Anderson v. Cryovac,
Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1986); Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 20.
194. Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the
Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 374–78 (1999).
195. See Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 47 (1983) (examining situations where the public’s interest in viewing litigation documents
would be “outweighed by other interests,” specifically, the litigants’ interest in confidentiality
where a document is produced for in camera review).
196. See generally Miller, supra note 183.
197. E.g., id. at 479 (“[O]nce an action is commenced, the complaint and all subsequent
pleadings, filings, and court proceedings are open, and the public and the press can therefore obtain
more information . . . as the litigation progresses.”); Dore, supra note 194, at 383.
198. E.g., David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619,
2648 (1995).
199. Id.
200. Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457,
484–85.
201. Miller, supra note 183, at 484–85.
202. See, e.g., id. at 470 (noting that businesses fear disclosure of proprietary and
unsubstantiated information during pre-trial proceedings).
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modifying class certification doctrine is an odd, problematic way of
achieving that goal. It can be managed in a far better, more nuanced, way
through a gag order.203
Preliminary merits inquiries are a very blunt tool to address these
potential issues. It is certainly possible that the existence of a class action
can impose costs on the defendant. The larger scale of the class action
will often make a case of that sort more newsworthy. 204 Furthermore, it
may be especially troubling for defendants to suffer these costs when the
plaintiffs’ case is weak. These considerations must be balanced against
values like public access to the courts and information generally, though,
so we need especially good reasons to conceal the existence of a class
action from the public. Rules barring truly frivolous 205 or implausible206
claims would seem to be adequate safeguards.
Overall, there are competing values that a blanket preliminary merits
inquiry doctrine fails to take into account. To illustrate, we can consider
two scenarios. In one case there is a class action based on an old contract
or business practice that the defendant no longer uses.207 In that case, the
defendant might suffer serious publicity costs, so a rule curtailing them
appears attractive; it may seem overly harsh to risk bankrupting the
defendant over such an issue, especially if they have already stopped the
suspect practice. On the other hand, suppose the litigation is based on a
product that causes harm to some people who use it, like the allegation
that faulty ignition switches in some General Motors models caused
accidents, which were made especially dangerous because the same
failing also caused the airbags not to function.208 A highly-publicized
class action would presumably harm a defendant like General Motors, but
keeping this information from the public can cause widespread serious
harm as well, robbing them of the opportunity to take precautions,
203. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1986) (court issued protective order
due to increasing and “potentially harmful” publicity of the case). See Katie Eccles, Note, The
Agent Orange Case: A Flawed Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Granting
Pretrial Access to Discovery, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1577, 1615–16 (1990) (discussing instances where
the public should presumptively have access to the settlement negotiations and proceedings).
204. Although hundreds of lawsuits stemming from the same events or filed against the same
defendant could itself be newsworthy.
205. See supra note 123.
206. See Part III, infra.
207. For example, the FTC’s case against Countrywide Home Loans. See, e.g., FTC Returns
Nearly $108 Million to 450,000 Homeowners Overcharged by Countrywide for Loan Servicing
Fees, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 20, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2011/07/ftc-returns-nearly-108-million-450000-homeowners-overcharged.
208. E.g., In re Gen. Motors L.L.C. Ignition Switch Litig., 154 F. Supp. 3d 30, 33 (S.D.N.Y.
2015).
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investigate the issue, and so on. These publicity concerns, therefore,
cannot form a solid foundation for preliminary merits inquiries as
currently applied. The doctrine is simply far too broad and blunt.
D. Putting Settlement Pressure in Perspective
Looking at the root causes of settlement pressure shows that it cannot
play its crucial role of justifying preliminary merits inquiries. The law
and procedural rules no less, should not privilege one party’s preferences,
exacerbate principal-agent problems, or help conceal the existence of
litigation from the public. In order for settlement pressure to play the role
it has in class action cases, these goals must be worth achieving, and
procedural rules instituted by the courts209 must be the right way to go
about doing so. Settlement pressure is frequently characterized as
extortion or blackmail. So characterized, it is easy to see why courts
would feel compelled to counteract it. Despite the rhetorical force of this
characterization, settlement, even at a premium, more closely resembles
litigation insurance. Courts have been concerned that defendants will
overpay in a settlement.210 Continuing with the stylized example from
Part II.A., suppose that the parties reach a settlement where the defendant
agrees to pay $12 million while the expected value of the suit is only $80
million. This is a substantial markup, and the difference between the
“objective” expected value is the result of the defendant’s risk aversion
or something similar. While this leads the defendant to pay more money
than it would otherwise, crucially, the defendant in this example received
value for its money.
In these cases, the settlement, including the risk premium, functions as
a form of insurance. The defendant is paying to guard against a low
probability event that a class action verdict would be issued against it.
The extra $4 million in the above example is the fee this defendant is
willing to pay to prevent the eight percent chance that they will be held
liable for the entire class action. The “blackmail settlement” is simply
another form of insurance, which is perfectly permissible under the law.
Indeed, corporate defendants almost uniformly purchase litigation
insurance.211 When agreeing to these settlements, the defendant is
209. As opposed to those instituted by the legislature, which has a freer hand in picking winners
and losers.
210. E.g., West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
211. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 117, at 550. Alexander notes that “[n]inety-four percent
of public companies with more than 500 shareholders have directors’ and officers’ liability (D&O)
insurance.” See also Silver, supra note 1, at 1414. The existence of such insurance may also skew
settlement values. At the time of the litigation the money an insurer would be obligated to pay does
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responding to risk in a rational, strategic way. This decision, even taking
the risk premium into account, is no different from any number of
responses to the legal or regulatory environment. It is analogous to
retaining an expensive law firm, or even to seek the advice of counsel.
These are costs that the defendant may opt to bear in order to decrease
the probability that it will pay a large verdict. Settlement works the same
way. Arguments based on settlement pressure must explain what
distinguishes settlement from these other expenses.
A perhaps natural response is that someone confronted by a gunman
who demands “your money or your life” is also responding to risk in a
rational, strategic way. The legal system, however, is not considered to
be on par with an armed robber; this comparison assumes the
conclusion.212 Plaintiffs have legal rights and are entitled to test them
through the legal process. Private law does not have the wholesale
illegitimacy of a gunman. If it did, settlement pressure and class actions
would be a small part of a much larger problem. Moreover, large claims,
ones that may frighten a defendant, are not presumptively forbidden by
the law. Federal antitrust violations are awarded treble damages,
massively increasing the defendant’s liability. Following this argument,
antitrust claims should also be considered extortionate.
The class action vehicle naturally increases the chance of a single large
judgment. In cases where the class claim is weak, it increases the
possibility of a very large verdict from infinitesimal, the extremely low
probability that the defendant loses every individual case, to whatever the
chances are that the class plaintiffs might prevail. The expected value of
the suit does not change, though. The slim chance that the defendant
might face tremendous liability is balanced by the very likely possibility
that it will be cleared of all liability. While it is true that the law creates
the potential for a very large verdict that inflicts this expected cost on
defendants, that is, of course, true for any sort of civil suit. Other legal
rules such as strict liability similarly impose expected costs on
defendants. Defendants can insure themselves against liability in those
not come out of the defendant’s pocket—the defendant has already paid the premiums—so it will
be more generous as it does not effectively bear the entire cost. See Alexander, supra note 117, at
550 (stating that value of a case may be just as much a function of how much insurance coverage
defendant purchased as it is a function of strength of legal argument); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty
to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1114–15, 1150–58 (1990) (explaining that without tort litigation,
liability insurance would decrease).
212. A full discussion distinguishing the law from outright extortion is outside the scope of this
Article. A classic discussion is contained in H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012).
Suffice to say, if the law and civil liability generally are nothing more than extortion, then
settlement pressure is the least of the procedural issues.
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cases, (or seek the advice of skilled lawyers before undertaking risky
actions, etc.) and since settlement pressure functions as insurance, it
should not be treated any differently. Litigation insurance may have its
own drawbacks, such as blunting the deterrent effect of the tort system.213
But, settlement pressure is not unique and should not be treated as the
bête noire of civil procedure.
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The focus of this Article has been on the main justification for
preliminary merits inquiries in class actions: settlement pressure. The
soundest version of settlement pressure is that class certification creates
an additional cost for the defendant. That is, the defendant is put in a
worse position when the class is certified as opposed to the same claims
brought individually against it. Settlement pressure, in turn, depends on
the defendant’s risk aversion or something that influences the defendant
in the same way. A risk neutral defendant treats the class action no
differently than the individual cases by class members. But, a risk averse
defendant treats the possibility of a single large loss differently, giving it
more weight.
Risk aversion, however, is not an adequate basis for class action
doctrine. Instituting preliminary merits inquiries in response to it means
crafting procedural rules around the defendant’s idiosyncrasies, including
its psychological quirks, capital reserves, business model, and access to
credit. Indeed, the preliminary merits inquiries are responding to these
particular qualities that defendants may or may not have with a
comprehensive rule that lacks nuance. Furthermore, if we take the
principle here seriously—for example, if we agree that these
considerations should shape the rules for class certification—then it
becomes hard to cabin. What makes the defendant’s attitudes toward risk
relevant only for class certification? Why do they not shape other
elements of the trial? This argument proves too much, as it would justify
a host of prodefendant doctrines simply on the basis that defendants
would prefer them. It seems odd, at the very least, to rationalize sweeping
doctrines on the grounds that they would benefit one side of the dispute.
If the law in these cases should be sensitive to the defendant’s attitudes
toward risk, then it should equally take into account the plaintiffs’
attitudes. There should be complementary doctrines responsive to the
plaintiffs’ risk aversion. In constructing the strongest case for preliminary
merits inquiries, I explored alternative accounts that would have a similar
213. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 73 (1996).
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effect. That is, even if the defendant is not, properly speaking, risk averse,
it might still act as if it was. These alternative accounts also do not provide
a sound justification for preliminary merits inquiries.
The central point of this Article is that settlement pressure is not a good
reason for class action rules, where the concept has proven especially
influential. Accordingly, the preliminary merits inquiries that are now
part of the class certification process lack a compelling justification. This
Part explores practical issues relevant to settlement pressure before
concluding with a brief description of how courts should conduct class
certification analysis in light of these observations.
A. Negative Value Claims
The forgoing discussion has set aside the issue of negative value
claims, which are those where the litigation costs exceed any likely
recovery. As one court colorfully stated: “[O]nly a lunatic or a fanatic
sues for $30.”214 Negative value claims are especially important to class
actions because class actions are the main means of pursuing them. 215
Negative value claims also alter the settlement pressure dynamic
described previously. In an ordinary class action case, one where the class
members might contemplate suing individually, the class certification
decision does not change the expected value of the litigation one way or
the other. The set of individual claims and the aggregated class claim are
both worth the same. So, any settlement pressure had to come from risk
aversion or analogous incentives. But, with negative value claims, the
expected values differ as, for example, “[t]he realistic alternative to a
class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual
suits.”216 The foregoing arguments therefore do not apply in a
straightforward way to negative value claims. With a negative value
claim, class certification determines whether or not the suit is viable.
In principle, it would be possible to develop a separate class
certification rule for negative value claims. Rule 23 is written in general
terms, and procedural rules are usually considered to apply equally to all
suits. Yet, there is already something of a de facto special class
certification rule for negative value claims. Courts consider whether the
case could be pursued via individual litigation or not, typically as part of
Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that a class action be a superior method of

214. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
215. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997)).
216. Carnegie, 376 F.3d at 661.
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adjudicating the controversy.217 Rhone-Poulenc also noted it in
considering whether that class action should be able to move forward.218
Since the arguments in this Article do not apply in the same way to
negative value claims, preliminary merits inquiries could be confined to
those cases. But, this would be a complete reversal of the current practice.
The fact that a class action involves negative value claims has
consistently been thought a powerful reason in favor of certifying the
class. “The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to
overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive
for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”219
Or, as another court put the same idea: “Rule 23(b)(3) was designed for
situations such as this, in which the potential recovery is too slight to
support individual suits, but injury is substantial in the aggregate.”220
Negative value claims should be at least as easy to bring as other class
actions; it should not be the other way around. Applying preliminary
inquiries to them, and only them, would undermine the purposes behind
Rule 23 and class actions.
Moreover, tightening class certification rules with regard to negative
value claims would have to be balanced against the social importance of
creating a system where such claims can be brought. Without something
like class actions someone is free to inflict harm on others provided they
make sure the harm is diffuse—so long as they harm a lot of people just
a little bit, they would get away with it—and this state of affairs is not the
product of a deliberate policy choice, just an unfortunate side effect of
the practical costs of vindicating one’s rights through litigation. These
considerations, as noted above, are one of the main reasons behind
permitting class actions. Therefore, although the main arguments of this
Article do not directly apply to negative value claim class actions, there
are independent reasons against subjecting them to a preliminary merits
inquiry.
217. E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 617; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 809 (1985); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 420 (5th Cir. 1998); Castano v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,
1299 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 348 (N.D. Ohio
2001). See also AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011) (holding the
Federal Arbitration Act preempts California’s judicial rule regarding arbitration waivers in
consumer contracts); id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating the merits of class proceedings
should not factor into the current decision); Pyke v. Cuomo, 209 F.R.D. 33, 46 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)
(explaining that Rule 23(b)(3) is not limited to negative value claims).
218. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299.
219. Mace, 109 F.3d at 344; see also Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace, 109
F.3d at 344); Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299.
220. Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006).
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B. Preliminary Merits Inquiries in Practice
So far, this Article has argued, in essence, that there are no “pros” in
favor of such inquiries, they have no sound foundation; this Part describes
some of the “cons.” In practice, preliminary merits inquiries, especially
Wal-Mart’s redefinition of commonality, resemble the plausibility
pleading standard put in place by Twombly and Iqbal,221 and they inherit
those cases’ shortcomings. Tangentially, since plausibility pleading is
also based, in part, on settlement pressure considerations,222 this Article
may prompt us to reexamine it as well. Plausibility pleading has been
criticized as being both vague and subjective.223 Under Twombly a
complaint must include factual allegations that “raise a right [of] relief
above the speculative level,”224 pleading enough facts “to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”225 This standard is inherently
ambiguous, and the Court’s later statements that the “plausibility standard
is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” 226 do not do much to
clarify it. As Judge Posner noted:
This is a little unclear because plausibility, probability, and possibility
overlap. Probability runs the gamut from a zero percent likelihood to a
certainty. What is impossible has a zero likelihood of occurring and
what is plausible has a moderately high likelihood of occurring. The
fact that the allegations undergirding a claim could be true is no longer
enough to save a complaint from being dismissed; the complaint must
establish a nonnegligible probability that the claim is valid; but the
probability need not be as great as such terms as ‘preponderance of the
evidence’ connote.227

There is somewhere along the spectrum from impossible to
221. See supra notes 90–96.
222. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 558–59 (2007).
223. Stephen R. Brown, Correlation Plausibility: A Framework for Fairness and Predictability
in Pleading Practice After Twombly and Iqbal, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 141, 145–46 (2010); Hon.
Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower Courts After
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 867 (2008); Miller, supra note 90, at
334–37; A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009);
Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1313 (2010) (highlighting the
problems with the plausibility pleading reading of Twombly and Iqbal); Z.W. Julius Chen, Note,
Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1431, 1441 (2008); Colleen McNamara, Note, Iqbal as Judicial Rorschach Test: An Empirical
Study of District Court Interpretations of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 401, 403 (2011).
224. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
225. Id. at 570.
226. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
227. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Spencer,
supra note 223, at 6–11 (arguing for the need for a descriptive theory of pleading).
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preponderance of the evidence where plausibility lies, although where
exactly is unknown. Even Posner’s invocation of a “moderately high
likelihood”228 does little to clarify things: it reads as if it should be at least
a fifty percent probability—something with less than that would not
usually be thought of having a high likelihood at all—but by context it
has to be less than preponderance of the evidence. The standard itself is
vague, not to mention the difficulty of trying to actually determine, with
the required degree of precision, the likelihood that the allegations are
true. Furthermore, Justice Souter—the author of Twombly—argued that
couching the plausibility standard in terms of probability that the
plaintiffs’ allegations are true represents a “fundamental
misunderstanding of the enquiry that Twombly demands.”229
Twombly does not require a court at the motion to dismiss stage to
consider whether the factual allegations are probably true.
We made it clear, on the contrary, that a court must take the allegations
as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be. The sole exception to
this rule lies with allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality
as we know it: claims about little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent
trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel.230

Similar problems plague Wal-Mart. The Supreme Court required
plaintiffs to prove the existence of a uniform, company-wide practice that
affected enough employment decisions at Wal-Mart.231 How many
employment decisions—“whether 0.5 percent or 95 percent”—the
plaintiffs would need to establish to satisfy Rule 23 was left
undetermined.232 Similarly, how much proof is needed, whether the claim
is plausible, probable, or just possible, is also unclear, although mere
possibility appears insufficient.233
In practice, courts that certify classes post-Wal-Mart seem to adopt a
standard of high plausibility: if plaintiffs can establish the existence of
228. In re Text Messaging, 630 F.3d at 629.
229. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 695–96 (Souter, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 696 (citations omitted).
231. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011).
232. Id. at 354 (quoting Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ and Defendant’s
Motions to Strike Expert and Non-Expert Testimony, 222 F.R.D. 189, 192 (2004)).
233. Wal-Mart’s majority opinion leaned heavily on Falcon, which requires in the absence of
an explicit challenged practice (e.g., an employment test), “significant proof” that the defendant
“operated under a general policy of discrimination.” Id. at 349. Although this statement is made in
a footnote and dicta. Neither case provides much guidance as to what this phrase means, other than
to indicate that the respective plaintiffs failed to achieve significant proof. One of the dissents in
the Ninth Circuit decision to certify the case in Wal-Mart also relied on Falcon but noted that the
standard coming out of that case was unclear. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 632
(9th Cir. 2010) (Ikuta, J., dissenting), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
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some policy or practice on the part of the defendants and make a credible
argument as to how it connects with the alleged harm, then they can
satisfy Rule 23.234 This highlights another similarity between Wal-Mart
and plausibility pleading: the subjectivity of the respective standards.
Iqbal instructs “the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense”235 and to consider alternative, innocent explanations for
the defendant’s conduct.236 The plausibility standard, thus, is inherently
subjective as judicial experience varies from judge to judge.237 The class
certification analogue to this standard fares better in this regard because
the judge will typically have more information available. Twombly and
Iqbal require judges to evaluate the case based entirely on the pleadings,
a task to which those documents are not well suited.238 Class certification
decisions, on the other hand, are made with the benefit of discovery. 239
Still, a judge’s prior beliefs affect these assessments.240 In Wal-Mart, for
example, Justice Scalia expressed skepticism that managers would
discriminate based on sex if left to their own devices.241 Unsurprisingly,
the plaintiffs in that case faced a challenging burden of proof, and their
evidence was “worlds away from” satisfying it. In McReynolds v. Merrill
Lynch,242 an employment discrimination case certified under the
234. See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 708 F.3d 704, 709 (6th
Cir. 2013) (explaining two company-wide policies that gave rise to disparate impacts relating to
earnings of African American employees); Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 898 (7th
Cir. 2012) (holding that the plaintiffs could not be certified as a class as the policy it contested was
not “company-wide”); McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482,
489 (7th Cir. 2012) (arguing that two company-wide policies “exacerbate[ed] racial discrimination”
within the company to conform with the holding in Wal-Mart); M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry,
294 F.R.D. 7, 26 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (stating that, for the purposes of finding commonality, “[i]t is
not enough that class members suffer the same type of injury or have been subject to a violation of
the same law. Rather, a plaintiff must identify a unified common policy, practice, or course of
conduct that is the source of their alleged injury.” (citations omitted)).
235. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2nd Cir. 2007)).
236. Miller, supra note 90, at 335.
237. E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821, 840 (2010); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How PreDismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 65, 92–93 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice:
A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1734 (2013); Miller, supra note 90, at
335.
238. Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase—Underlying
Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976,
977 (1937).
239. See supra note 122.
240. For a different analysis based on similar observations, see Spencer, supra note 101, at
482–83.
241. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011).
242. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 483 (7th Cir.
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Wal-Mart standard,243 however, Judge Posner found the basic causal
theory those plaintiffs presented more convincing, leading to class
certification,244 a trend that can be seen in other post-Wal-Mart cases
where plaintiffs have won on this issue.245
There are, therefore, two related problems with preliminary merits
inquiries. Not only is the standard vague—Rhone-Poulenc indicates that
a case where plaintiffs have a less than ten percent chance of winning
“lacks legal merit,” but there is not much guidance beyond that—but
because the assessment has to be made at an early stage of the case, it will
be substantially influenced by their preconceptions and biases. If a judge
has a prior belief that a kind of discrimination or other actionable
behavior is unlikely, the plaintiffs will be less able to show that in this
instance it actually occurred.
A subtle, but far-reaching practical ramification of preliminary merits
inquiries is that they will stifle legal innovation. A class claim based on a
novel legal theory will tend to face the sort of skepticism described above.
Further, as an innovative kind of claim, it will lack clear supportive
precedents, so it will appear unlikely to succeed, especially at an early
stage of the litigation. Screening out such cases through Rule 23 means
that they never get far enough to impact and potentially advance the
law.246 It is through the development of those precedents that the law
improves. Preventing novel claims from having a full hearing denies the
law that resource for development. This side effect of preliminary merits
inquiries, and of the settlement pressure logic that supports them, runs
counter to other Supreme Court class action decisions that treat novel
legal claims more generously.247 While it is true that settlement in general
2012).
243. Id. at 487–88.
244. Id. at 489–92.
245. See Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 116–17 (4th Cir. 2013) (remanding
for further review an amended complaint alleging that “women suffer disparate impact as a direct
result of [a] corporate-imposed pay preference for lateral hires”); M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry,
294 F.R.D. 7, 61 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (stating that plaintiffs “satisfied their burdens at class
certification . . . by identifying a unified policy or practice and connecting that policy to the alleged
harm”); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 533 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Accordingly,
consistent with Dukes and McReynolds, the Court concludes that along with Plaintiffs’ disparate
treatment described above, Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim also satisfies the commonality
requirement.”); Calibuso v. Bank of Am. Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 374, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(allowing plaintiffs’ motion for class certification regardless of the fact that a challenged policy
allowed for discretion by defendants’ managers and supervisors).
246. See generally Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the Evolution of Legal
Remedies: A Dynamic Model, 116 PUB. CHOICE 419 (2003); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein,
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
247. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
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can have this effect, it should not be exacerbated by doctrine. It is one
thing for litigants to make these decisions, especially given the need for
them to vigorously litigate claims, but quite another for the law itself to
be doing it. In addition, since class actions by their nature affect many
parties at once, the social costs of preemptively closing off these claims
may be quite large.248
C. Commonality and the Distinct Challenge of Class Actions
The main focus of this Article has been to critique doctrines that make
class certification depend on an estimation of the merits of the case.
While these preliminary merits inquiries are unwarranted and carry
difficulties of their own, that does not imply that class certification should
be easily granted. A form of rigorous commonality analysis is an essential
tool to address the distinct problem posed by class actions. This analysis
should have very little to do with the merits. Class actions aggregate
claims, which can potentially strengthen weaker claims by masking
weakness. The plaintiffs could cherry-pick the best, most persuasive of
the claims possessed by class members, presenting only them to the court
and jury, and then on the basis of those particular claims win on behalf of
the entire class.249 For example, suppose that in a case like Wal-Mart
there was excellent evidence that one of the regional managers
consistently made promotion decisions in a way that discriminated
against female employees. If the class plaintiffs were able to rely solely
on evidence relating to that manager—to build their case around her—
then they would substantially increase their chances of winning and the
value of their lawsuit. In this instance, the class action vehicle would have
altered the expected value of the suit. There is a mirror reflection of
plaintiff-based cherry-picking where defendants have various defenses
against some individual claims by class members, and then amalgamate
them together to create an artificially strong class-wide defense.250 This
U.S. 797, 824 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see Sun Oil Co.,
486 U.S. at 749 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority’s
holding for a class action defendant did not give full faith and credit to the state laws at issue); In
re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300–01 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining the plaintiffs’
novel “serendipity theory” of negligence and noting that different states’ negligence jurisprudence
will interpret that argument differently).
248. It is possible that the claim could still enter the law through subsequent individual
litigation. That would depend on the nature of the claim at hand and would notably still exclude
negative value ones. It would also exclude claims distinctly suited for class actions. The corporate
culture argument in Wal-Mart, for instance, is unlikely to be relevant in an individual employment
discrimination action.
249. Erbsen, supra note 87, at 1010–11; Nagareda, supra note 10, at 1890.
250. Erbsen, supra note 87, at 1012.
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potential bootstrapping effect of class actions operates differently than
settlement pressure and risk aversion. Those phenomena were based on
idiosyncratic features of the defendant and how it structured its affairs,
and, importantly, offered the defendant value when it apparently overpaid
because of the class action. The defendant made these decisions rationally
given its preferences and goals. By contrast, cherry-picking modifies the
underlying probability that the plaintiffs will prevail, giving class
members a windfall without any corresponding benefit to the defendant.
Rule 23’s commonality requirement, that “there are questions of law
or fact common to the class”251 is capable of managing this problem.
Courts could also rely on Rule 23’s typicality requirement, that “the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class,”252 but that alone does not appear sufficient.
Typicality can be vague—“[t]ypicality is a concept that sounds sensible
but means little”253—and by its own terms it does not perfectly address
the problem at hand. Typicality is instead designed, and best suited, to
prevent differences between class representatives and the members of the
class at large.254 In practice, this may matter little as “the commonality
and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge” 255 and courts
frequently do not delineate between them.256 The two requirements are
closely related: if all the issues of law and fact are common to the class
members, then any class member selected will be “typical.” They also
blend with Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy of representation requirement for
the same reason257: if the class members all share the same interests, then
that helps any one of them serve as an adequate representative for the
others, they all would conduct the litigation in the same manner.
Courts should therefore conduct a rigorous analysis of commonality,
251. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
252. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
253. Erbsen, supra note 87, at 1068. See also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE
729 (2d. ed. 1993) (“It is not entirely clear what the rulemakers intended to achieve with this
requirement.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999
SUP. CT. REV. 337, 354 (noting the “amorphous” nature of the rule).
254. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 387 n.120 (1967) (“Clause (3) of
subdivision (a) emphasizes that the representatives ought to be squarely aligned in interest with the
represented group.”); but see Erbsen, supra note 87, at 1068–69 (“Rule 23’s requirement that class
representatives be ‘adequate’ more effectively captures this desire to link the interests of class
representatives and class members.”).
255. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982).
256. Courts also often collapse Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement and 23(a)(2) because
predominance is seen as a stricter form of commonality.
257. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157–58, 157 n.13.
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checking whether the class plaintiffs’ claims depend on common legal or
factual issues. As Wal-Mart pointed out, not any common questions will
do, they must have a major impact on the litigation.258 This alone marked
a substantial break with pre-Wal-Mart practice; prior to Wal-Mart
commonality was sometimes treated as a minimal, not particularly
demanding burden.259 The problem with preliminary merits inquiries is
that they test the persuasiveness of the class claim as well, establishing
some ill-defined threshold of likelihood that the claims would actually
succeed in order for the class action to proceed. The requirements for
class certification should be rigorously enforced, but courts should focus
on the coherence of the case. The relevant questions are whether the
theory of the case put forward by the class makes sense, and whether it is
a claim on behalf of the entire class. The proper model is a conditional
statement: if the plaintiffs’ allegations are treated as true, then would all
class members be entitled to relief? If a court answers this question
affirmatively, and the plaintiffs’ contentions are not outlandish, then
plaintiffs should have carried their burden under Rule 23’s commonality
requirement.260
McReynolds and M.D. v. Perry are good examples.261 In McReynolds,
The Seventh Circuit carefully noted that it did not necessarily conclude
that Merrill Lynch’s seemingly innocent teaming and account
distribution rules actually violated antidiscrimination laws, 262 as
plaintiffs contended, but it still certified the class because the theory of
the case made sense. On remand, the district court in M.D. v. Perry
conducted a rigorous analysis, including extensive discovery,263 and
certified some of the class claims.264 The central claim was that Texas
failed to provide enough caseworkers to keep children in long-term foster
care adequately safe. The court noted that despite significant amounts of
evidence and hearings, there was still some doubt as to just how
overworked caseworkers generally were as well as some question about
258. See supra note 77; see also Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 909–10 (7th Cir.
2012) (distinguishing the case from Wal-Mart because of the impact the company’s policy had on
the plaintiffs as a whole), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 569 U.S. 901 (2013).
259. See, e.g., James v. City of Dallas, 254 F.3d 551, 570 (5th Cir. 2001); Hanlon v. Chrysler
Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998); Lewis Tree Serv., Inc. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 211
F.R.D. 228, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 47, § 1763.
260. Class plaintiffs also, of course, have to satisfy the other requirements of Rule 23, including
those contained in Rule 23(b), which have not been the focus of this Article.
261. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012);
M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
262. McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 490.
263. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg, 294 F.R.D. at 36.
264. Id. at 67.
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the appropriate legal standard.265 Yet, there was an intuitive connection
between the amount of time and energy a caseworker could devote to
each of the children they were responsible for and that child’s safety. 266
This ruling did not depend on the situation being so bad that it violated
the state’s Fourteenth Amendment responsibilities,267 which was a matter
for a later trial. But, the plaintiffs’ theory was coherent and addressed the
class as a whole, so it could be certified.
Answering these questions may sometimes touch upon the plaintiffs’
factual allegations or the elements of their case. In these instances, courts
should follow Justice Souter’s advice regarding the plausibility pleading
standard.268 If the plaintiffs’ allegations are not outlandish, then the court
should provisionally accept them as true. On this understanding, the
corporate culture theory in Wal-Mart satisfies the commonality
requirement. It might be novel, and extremely difficult to prove, that the
company has a corporate culture with a particular content and that the
corporate culture significantly influenced employment decisions, but
those facts do not render it incoherent. If the plaintiffs’ allegations were
true, then class members as a whole would be entitled to relief. There
might be good reasons to be skeptical that corporate cultures exist in such
a strong form or exert such influence over individual decision makers,
but that is a far cry from little green men or time travel—some expert
testimony269 supporting the theory, showing that this could possibly be
the case should suffice at the class certification stage.
The interpretation of commonality put forward here is probably less
stringent than the one courts currently use post-Wal-Mart, although the
comparison is not a straightforward one. The two approaches focus on
265. Id. at 39.
266. Id. at 42.
267. Id. at 44.
268. Which, it bears underscoring, was in a dissent. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 695–96
(2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
269. The parties disputed whether Bielby’s testimony qualified as expert testimony under the
Rules of Evidence and Daubert. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 354–55 (2011).
This matter was not resolved in Wal-Mart, though if Bielby did not qualify as an expert then that
should be taken into account at class certification. The Supreme Court has not yet definitely ruled
as to whether Daubert applies to evidence at the class certification stage, although other courts
have. Id. at 354; In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2015); In re U.S.
Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig., 729 F.3d 108, 129 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 37–38 (2013) (holding a regression model developed by plaintiffs’ expert
witness could not be accepted as evidence that damages were susceptible to measurement across
entire class due to the model’s methodology). If the plaintiffs’ case depends on expert testimony,
courts should enforce some minimal threshold on that testimony—this is a way of ensuring that the
claims are not outlandish—even if the expert’s assessments may eventually be rebutted in the
course of a trial on the merits.
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different things, the nature and structure of the claim on the one hand and
the evidence in favor of it on the other. There are certainly cases that
would be certified under this standard that would not be under WalMart’s or any form of preliminary merits inquiry. However, whether a
class certification standard is more or less permissive is not, in and of
itself, a point for or against it. The standard described in this section
focuses on an issue specific to class actions—the potential for cherrypicking—and does not rely on the dubious basis of settlement pressure.
It also avoids the pitfalls of preliminary merits inquiries. The standard is
less arbitrary since it does not rely so directly on judges’ preconceptions
and their capacity to construct alternative explanations for the situation.
It is also less vague. While none of these standards are truly precise—
plausibility, probability, and coherence are all ambiguous guidelines—
coherence is a coarser, more basic requirement, which in this context is
actually a virtue. Finding some dividing line between possible and
plausible, one that is consistent across courts no less, is extremely
difficult. There will undoubtedly be borderline cases on which courts may
reasonably disagree, but the challenge of line drawing is less acute.
Therefore, the coherence standard provides a better framework than
Wal-Mart’s revised version of commonality and preliminary merits
inquiries more generally.
CONCLUSION
Settlement pressure has had a profound, wide-ranging effect on the
law. Notably, it is the best justification for making class certification
depend on the merits of the case. Without it, such preliminary merits
inquiries are pointless—they seek to address a problem that will be
resolved in due course. Settlement pressure does not, however, have the
implications that have been ascribed to it. To the extent that defendants
are actually “pressured” to settle, they are making decisions based on
their own interests. They are not “overpaying” in any real sense;
settlements in these instances represent blackmail or extortion no more
than litigation insurance, portfolio diversification, hiring talented
counsel, or brand loyalty. Furthermore, halting cases in response to
settlement pressure has perverse results. It makes courts complicit in
managers hiding business affairs from both their shareholders and the
general public. Or, it entails the law simply placing defendant’s interests
above the plaintiffs’ without any valid explanation.
Preliminary merits inquiries therefore have no place in class
certification rulings. The estimate that plaintiffs have a slim chance of
winning their suit should not mean that the class action cannot go
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forward. Provided, that is, that they satisfy all the other requirements for
class certification. The commonality requirement, in particular, which
was so central to Wal-Mart’s pervasive preliminary merits inquiry,
should be carefully scrutinized. But, courts should focus on the structure
of the class claim. If the case stands or falls based on common questions
of law and fact, then it is a bona fide class claim, even if it seems unlikely
that those questions will eventually be answered in the plaintiffs’ favor.
The standard for class actions I have proposed here does not rest on the
troubled grounds of settlement pressure and helps resolve one of the
special challenges posed by class action litigation.
Class actions represent the best case for the settlement pressure
argument. But, as shown in this Article, settlement pressure is
problematic even in this context. We should therefore be especially
cautious about using it for legal rules in other kinds of cases. Settlement
pressure cannot serve as the basis for broad-ranging procedural doctrines.

